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Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a
Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future
Felix Mormanut
Solar, wind, and other renewable energy technologies have the potential
to mitigate climate change, secure America's energy independence, and create
millions of green jobs. In the absence of a price on carbon emissions, however,
these long-term benefits will not be realized without near-term policy support for
renewable energy. This Article assesses the efficiency of federal tax incentives for
renewables and proposes policy reform to promote renewable energy more cost-
effectively through capital markets and crowdfunding.
Federal support for renewable energy today comes primarily in the form
of accelerated depreciation and, critically, tax credits. Empirical evidence reveals
that only a fraction of the subsidy value of tax credits may actually go to funding
new renewable power projects. Why are tax credits for renewables so inefficient?
And where do the remaining tax dollars go?
Qualitative analysis suggests that the answer to both questions hinges on
the mismatch between the profitability requirements of tax credits and the revenue
profile of renewable energy projects. The value of tax credits lies in their capacity
to reduce tax liability and lower tax bills. Most renewable power projects, however,
require ten years or more to recover their up-front capital expenditures before they
begin to generate taxable profits and, hence, tax liability to reduce. Bringing in
investors with tax liability from other sources to monetize a project's tax credits
provides only partial relief. Such tax equity investment drives up a project's
financing charges and transaction costs, limits investment liquidity, and restricts
growth in the renewable energy marketplace.
Federal policymakers should give renewables access to master limited
partnerships (MLPs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs)- two tax-privileged
investment structures with a proven track record of promoting oil, gas, and other
conventional energy infrastructure. Merging the tax benefits of a partnership with
the fundraising advantages of a corporation, MLPs and REITs could significantly
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reduce the cost of capital for renewable energy projects, broaden their investor
appeal, and move renewables closer to subsidy independence. Most importantly,
MLPs and REITs have the potential to deliver these and more benefits to renewable
energy at considerably lower cost to taxpayers than the current regime of tax
credits.
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Introduction
"Gentlemen, we have run out of money. It is time to start thinking."
- Sir Ernest Rutherford
When Nobel laureate Sir Ernest Rutherford made his famous remarks a
century ago, he could not know that they would one day offer an accurate
description of the state of American clean energy policy. Billions of dollars in
federal subsidies have not managed to raise the share of solar, wind,
geothermal, and other low-carbon renewable sources in the nation's electricity
mix beyond eleven percent.2 Current projections forecast that future growth
will remain moderate at best, with renewables expected to account for no more
than fourteen percent of American electricity generation by 2035.3 Meanwhile,
mounting federal government debt of more than $17 trillion4 suggests that, if
anything, America may want to spend less, not more money on clean energy
policy going forward. As the United States becomes ever more strapped for
cash, we, indeed, need to start thinking.
Today the nation appears more locked into its fossil fuel addiction than
ever. Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have unlocked vast,
previously commercially inaccessible reserves of shale oil and natural gas.
This newly found wealth of domestic hydrocarbons has the potential to
improve, if not secure American energy independence for years to come.6 But it
does little to alleviate pressing concerns over U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
that constitute a major driver of global climate change.7 To be sure, replacing
the country's dated fleet of coal-fired power plants with cleaner, more efficient
natural gas-fired units would help reduce the power sector's overall carbon
footprint.8 Burning natural gas to generate electricity, however, still emits too
I. See NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE ET AL., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM,
REVISITED- RAPIDLY APPROACHING CATEGORY 5, at vii (2010).
2. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2011, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY 3
(2011), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/alliance/documents/EDF/Wednesday/Healmaterial.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See U.S. DEBT CLOCK, http://www.usdebtclock.org (last visited May 15, 2014). For
a discussion of the federal deficit's potential implications for questions of policy sustainability, see
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S MARCH TOWARD BANKRUPTCY
86-87 (2007).
5. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas
Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, U.S.
DEP'T ENERGY 10 (EIA 2013) (citing data that ranks the United States first in commercially recoverable
shale gas reserves).
6. Id.
7. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Renewable Energy: Economically Sound, Politically
Difficult, 21 ELEC. J. 18, 22 (2008) (comparing the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of conventional
and renewable power plants).
8. Id.
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much greenhouse gas to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius as
compared to pre-industrialization levels.9 Scientists consider this two-degree
scenario vital to avoiding massive and irreversible damage to the global
ecosystem.10 Moreover, electricity from natural gas may be less carbon-
intensive than coal at the combustion stage, but methane leakage, flaring,
excessive water use and pollution, as well as potential seismic disturbances at
the extraction stage all present serious threats to local environments and the
global climate.
Successful climate change mitigation calls for a timely decarbonization of
the American electricity sector, the single largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions.12 To do so will require concerted efforts from the public and private
sectors alike to enhance the efficiency with which we generate, transport, and
use energy and to promote the large-scale deployment of renewable power
generation technology. Energy efficiency has been identified as the likely least-
cost option for greenhouse gas emission abatement in the near term.13
Accordingly, America's ability to harness energy efficiency for successful
climate change mitigation will depend less on financial support than on long-
overdue reform of the regulatory business model of electric utilities. Ever since
the days of Samuel Insull,14 the revenue and profit of regulated utilities have
been linked to the amount of energy they sell. More sales generally justify
greater infrastructure investment and, with it, greater overall returns.15 Reform
of this long-standing regulatory framework presents a major challenge for
energy efficiency that warrants further investigation. But neither policymakers
nor scholars can afford to focus their efforts solely on energy efficiency. After
9. For an overview of the necessary pace and scenarios for decarbonization of the
global energy economy to meet the two-degree scenario, see Special Report on Renewable Energy
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 19
(2011), http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCCSRRENFullReport.pdf.
10. For an overview of the numerous peer-reviewed studies and their warnings not to
exceed the two-degree scenario, see Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius - The Way
Ahead for 2020 and Beyond, COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS. (COM) (2007) 2 final (Oct. 1, 2007).
I1. For an overview of the diverse environmental impacts of natural gas exploration
through hydraulic fracturing, see David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy ofEnergy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 440-46 (2013).
12. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2011, ES-21, 2-20,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-G
HG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy, MCKINSEY & CO. 12 (2009),
http://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client service/sustainability/cost%20curve%20pd
fs/pathways lowcarbon economy version2.ashx; see also Steven Chu, Cleaning Up: Energy and
Climate Bill Will Boost the Economy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 22, 2009, http://www.timesdis
patch.com/news/article-e5d2835d-c68e-5249-8cc4-7af214751182.html ("[E]nergy efficiency is not just
low-hanging fruit; it is fruit that is lying on the ground.").
14. See PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID,
AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 2 (2010) (describing Samuel Insull as the visionary founder of
the electricity industry's structure and business model).
15. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989) ("The
utilities . . .are limited to a standard rate of return on the actual amount of money reasonably invested.").
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all, energy efficiency can only reduce, but never completely eliminate, our
nation's appetite for energy.
It is crucial, therefore, that sustained efforts to promote energy efficiency
be accompanied by support for greater deployment of low-carbon renewable
power generation technologies. Economists are in near-universal consensus that
putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions is, in theory, the most efficient
policy to promote abatement technologies, including those for the generation of
electricity from renewable resources.' Political and economic pressures to
keep electricity affordable and domestic industries globally competitive,
however, continue to impede the widespread adoption of emission pricing
policies that capture the full cost to society and the environment of greenhouse
gas emissions.'7 Encouraging developments such as California's introduction
of a cap-and-trade regime are met with setbacks such as Australia's plans to
abolish its carbon tax to reduce the cost of living for its citizens.19 Without a
realistic price on carbon, renewables continue to fight an uphill battle as they
compete with deeply entrenched fossil fuel incumbents. The ability to
externalize most of their societal and environmental costs allows coal, gas, and
other fossil power plants to produce and sell electricity at lower prices than
most renewable power plants.20 As a result, renewable energy requires not only
regulatory reform but also financial support to compete on a level playing field.
Federal deployment support for renewables comes primarily in the form
of tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation rates and tax credits. 21
16. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN
REVIEW 35 (2007); id at 348 ("In the absence of any other market failures, introducing a fully credible
carbon price path for applying over the whole time horizon relevant for investment would theoretically
be enough to encourage suitable technologies to develop."); Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of
Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 12 EIB PAPERS 110, 112 (2007); Carolyn Fischer
& Richard G. Newell, Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 142, 143 (2008); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess,
Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and Investment Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134,
140 (2007).
17. See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q.
901, 930 (2011).
18. See Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RES.
BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited May 15, 2014).
19. See Repealing the Carbon Tax, DEP'T ENV'T (Austl.),
http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/cleaner-environment/clean-air/repealing-carbon-tax (last visited
May 15, 2014).
20. See, e.g., Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis- Version 5.0, LAZARD (2011),
http://votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lazard-June- 11 -Levelized-Cost-of-Energy-and-proj-to
-2020-copy.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at 10 (comparing
the generation costs of various renewable energy technologies to the cost of electricity from non-
renewable resources).
21. See, e.g., Steve Corneli, Clean Energy and Tax Reform: How Tax Policy Can Help
Renewable Energy Contribute to Economic Growth, Energy Security and a Balanced Budget, U.S.
PARTNERSHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN. 15 (2012), http://uspref.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06
/Clean-Energy-and-Tax-Reform-White-Paper.pdf ("The most important federal policies for driving scale
deployment are tax benefits, such as production or investment tax credits, and accelerated depreciation
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Investment tax credits (ITC) reward investors for funding solar and select other
renewable power plants.22 Production tax credits (PTC) reward the generation
23of electricity from wind and select other renewable sources of energy.
Over 65 gigawatts (GW)-the equivalent of 65 nuclear power plants24
of newly-installed, mostly tax credit-funded renewable power generation
capacity from 2003 through 201225 have earned tax credits a reputation as
effective drivers of renewable energy deployment.26 But many politicians,
taxpayers, and scholars appear to be unaware of the inefficiencies that the
federal tax credit regime infuses into the deployment of renewable energy
technologies.27 Empirical evidence suggests that the recent deployment success
was bought at an inflated price, with tax credits delivering only half as much
renewable energy deployment per tax dollar spent as cash grants.28 Why are tax
credits so relatively inefficient? And where do the tax dollars behind federal tax
credits go if not to fund renewable energy? This Article posits that the answer
to both questions hinges on the mismatch between the profitability
requirements of tax credits and the revenue profile of renewable energy
projects.
To reap the value of tax credits, accelerated depreciation rates, and other
tax incentives requires sufficient tax liability to offset, usually in the form of
29taxable income. Renewable energy projects can take ten or more years before
they recover their high up-front capital expenditures and begin to generate
taxable profits.30 Without current tax liability from other sources, project
developers could carry forward their tax incentives for future use but the lost
for new renewable energy investments."); see also Mark Bolinger et al., PTC, ITC, or Cash Grant? An
Analysis of the Choice Facing Renewable Power Projects in the United States, NAT'L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LABORATORY 1 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45359.pdf; Ethan Zindler & Tyler
Tringas, Cash is King: Shortcomings of US Tax Credits in Subsidizing Renewables, BLOOMBERG NEW
ENERGY FIN. 1 (2009), http://www.novoco.com/energy/resource files/advocacy/ncoep testimony_0427
10.pdf; Reassessing Renewable Energy Subsidies-Issue Brief BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER 3 (2011),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPCRE%20Issue%20Brief 3-22.pdf ("[A] few federal tax
policies have been responsible for most of the financing directed to renewable energy projects.").
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2012) and infra Subsection I.B.2.
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 45 and infra Subsection I.B.1.
24. The figure is based on average nameplate generation capacity of 1,000 MW for
nuclear reactors. See, e.g., Katie Fehrenbacher, Nuclear Power By the Numbers, GIGAOM (Feb. 19,
2010, 9:25 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/02/19/nuclear-power-by-the-numbers.
25. See Rachel Gelman, 2012 Renewable Energy Data Book, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY 19
(2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl4osti/60197.pdf.
26. See infra Section II.A.
27. See, e.g., Patrick Dowdall, Using REITs for Renewable Energy Projects, 137 TAX
NOTES 1409, 1422 (2012) ("There is no doubt that energy tax credits have been critical to the
development of renewable energy projects.").
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See Alvin C. Warren & Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the
Fiction ofSafe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1752, 1758 (1982).
30. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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time value would impose a significant discount.3 ' Meanwhile, the tax code's
general prohibition of trafficking in tax attributes precludes the developer from
simply selling off her tax benefits. 32 The industry response to this dilemma has
been for developers to bring in an outside investor with sufficient tax liability
from other sources to monetize the project's tax credits.33 While such "tax
equity" investment allows for the timely monetization of otherwise carried
forward tax incentives, the pool of tax equity investors is limited to a few large
banks and highly profitable corporations. Many interested investors, such as
tax-exempt pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and retail investors do not
have big enough tax bills to exploit federal tax incentives for renewables. With
most of the investment community sidelined, 34 renewable energy projects
struggle to raise direly needed capital at reasonable cost. Sir Ernest
Rutherford's introductory quote thus speaks not only to the waning availability
of federal funds to support renewable energy but also to the critical dearth of
private capital to finance renewable energy projects.
The need for scarcely available tax equity capital drives up a project's
financing charges and transaction costs, limits investment liquidity, and
restricts growth in the renewable energy marketplace. 35 Regardless of whether
developers choose to carry their tax benefits forward into the future or monetize
them by bringing in a tax equity investor, in the end, only a fraction of the
subsidy value of federal tax incentives actually ends up funding renewable
energy deployment.
These inefficiencies urge reconsideration of America's reliance on federal
tax credits to drive the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based energy
economy. Three approaches have dominated the potpourri of policy proposals
on Capitol Hill for more cost-effective promotion of renewable energy
deployment. A federal cap-and-trade regime would limit the overall amount of
greenhouse gas emissions and, through the gradual reduction of this limit,
foster the development of abatement technologies, such as solar, wind, and
other renewable energy technologies. 36 A federal renewable portfolio standard
(RPS), also known as quota obligation, would require the nation's load-serving
electric utilities to source a certain share of the electricity they sell from
31. For example, assuming an internal rate of return (r) of ten percent, a tax credit with
a face value (FV) of $100 that cannot be used for the first 10 years of a project's lifetime has a net
present value (NPV) of only $38.55, where NPV = FV / (l+r)'o. See also Lily L. Batchelder et al.,
Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REv. 23 (2006)
(arguing that refundability could avoid the losses associated with carrying tax credits forward).
32. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Section Il.A.
34. Institutional investors, private wealth, and sovereign investment funds held over
$100 trillion in global assets under management in 2011, but have traditionally not invested in U.S.
renewable energy projects. See Michael Mendelsohn & David Feldman, Financing U.S. Renewable
Energy Projects Through Public Capital Vehicles: Qualitative and Quantitative Benefits, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 5 (2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl3osti/58315.pdf.
35. See infra Section III.B.
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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renewables. 37 Coupled with renewable energy certificates (RECs), an RPS
allows renewable power generators to sell both their electricity and the
corresponding certificates to earn more than the market rate for electricity
alone. A federal feed-in tariff, sometimes referred to as a CLEAN contract,39
would offer producers of electricity from renewable sources guaranteed grid
access and subsidized, long-term rates for their power output.40
Notwithstanding the relative strengths of each of the aforementioned policies,
none has managed to garner sufficient political support on Capitol Hill, as
evidenced by over thirty failed legislative proposals.4 1 In contrast, federal tax
credits for renewables have been subject to periodic expirations but these lapses
have been followed by eventual renewals.42 This Article suggests that the
political economy of renewable energy policy at the federal level systemically
favors tax policy over non-tax policy options to promote renewables. 43
Meanwhile, tax credits have proven resistant to reform proposals that could
render them more efficient and equitable, e.g., by making tax credits refundable
or tradable.
Against this background, this Article explores alternative options for
federal tax policy to more cost-effectively promote renewable energy
deployment than under the current regime of tax credits. Two tax-privileged
investment structures-master limited partnerships (MLPs) and real estate
investment trusts (REITs)-could prove to be game changers. Combining the
tax benefits of a partnership with the fundraising advantages of a corporation,
MLPs and REITs have a track record of cost-effectively promoting oil, gas, and
other conventional energy infrastructure. Publicly traded like corporations,
37. For details, see Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies
for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REVS. 1003, 1014 (2011).
38. Early adopters of certificate trading regimes include Belgium (Flanders), Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. See Anna Bergek & Staffan Jacobsson, Are Tradable Green Certificates a
Cost-Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent-Generating Machine? Lessons from Sweden
2003-2008,38 ENERGY POL'Y 1255, 1256 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Richard W. Caperton et al., CLEAN Contracts: Making Clean Local
Energy Accessible Now, CLEAN COALITION (2011), http://www.clean-coalition.org/site/wp-content/uplo
ads/2012/I l/CLEAN-report.pdf
40. For details, see MIGUEL MENDONCA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY: THE
FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 15 (2009); and Wilson H. Rickerson et al., Ifthe Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in
Tariffs to Meet U.S. Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELEC. J. 73, 73 (2007). The first nations to
establish feed-in tariffs were Portugal (1988), Germany (1990), Denmark (1992), and Spain (1994). See
MENDONGA ET AL., supra, at 77.
41. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of the many boom-and-bust cycles evidenced in U.S. federal support
for renewable energy, see MENDON(A ET AL., supra note 40, at 172-74; Bent Ole Gram Mortenson,
International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 179, 183 (2008); Deploying
Renewables: Principles for Effective Policies, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 108 (2008), http://www.iea.org/pub
lications/freepublications/publication/DeployingRenewables2008.pdf [hereinafter INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY 2008]; and Jesse Jenkins et al., Beyond Boom & Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy
Independence (2012), http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BeyondBoom-and Bust.pdf.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Sections V.A-B.
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MLPs and REITs can raise capital at competitive rates on capital markets,
while offering investors the same single-layer taxation as closely held, illiquid
partnerships. 45 If federal policymakers give renewable energy access to these
structures, it would allow developers to reduce their financing charges, broaden
the investor appeal of renewables, and move them closer to subsidy
independence.46 Remarkably, MLPs and REITs have the potential to deliver
these and more benefits to renewable energy at significantly lower (if any) cost
to taxpayers than the current regime of tax credits. 47
Part I of this Article introduces the present regime of federal tax
incentives to promote the deployment of solar, wind and other renewable
energy technologies. Part II surveys the mixed track record of federal tax
credits to assess their efficacy and efficiency. Part III identifies and explains the
inefficiencies that the federal tax credit regime infuses into the deployment of
renewable energy. Part IV posits that the political economy of federal policy
for renewable energy systemically favors tax policy over non-tax policy
options. Part V makes the case for opening MLPs and REITs up to renewable
energy investment in order to more cost-effectively promote renewable power
generation through federal tax policy.
I. Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy
For more than two decades, tax incentives have been the federal policy of
choice to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies.48 These
tax incentives come primarily in the form of two distinct instruments:
accelerated depreciation rates 49 and tax credits.50 Accelerated depreciation rates
are not specific to renewable energy facilities but, rather, available for a wide
range of capital assets to spur economic growth broadly. In contrast, the current
regime of federal tax credits for renewables is specific to the promotion of
solar, wind and other renewable power generation. From an economic
perspective, tax credits tend to be of relatively greater importance to renewable
energy deployment than accelerated depreciation. 51 Accordingly, this Article
45. See infra Section V.A.
46. See infra Section V.C.
47. See infra Section V.D.
48. See Mark Bolinger et al., Preliminary Evaluation of the Section 1603 Treasury
Grant Program for Renewable Power Projects in the United States, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 6804, 6804
(2010).
49. The accelerated depreciation rates that renewable energy assets enjoy today were
first established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
50. Federal tax credits for renewable energy were first created for wind power by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
51. See State of the Tax Equity Market, CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP: PROJECT FIN.
NEWSWIRE 28-29 (2012), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/33595324-e9f9-4c78-b284-9
93c23e71709/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d6849213-1 c27-49c4-a263-9a6393d3a2al/projectfi
nancenwmayl2.pdf. In fact, one industry insider has stated that "[m]any tax equity investors have
turned their noses up at the bonus [depreciation]." Id. at 33 (quoting Keith Martin).
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includes a brief discussion of accelerated depreciation for the sake of
52completeness but places greater emphasis on the present regime of federal tax
credits for renewable energy.53
A. Accelerated Depreciation Rates for Renewable Energy
The federal tax code generally allows for the annual depreciation of
capital investments over the useful life of the respective asset.54 Every year,
these depreciation allowances enable the asset's owner to deduct the prorated
share of the investment cost from her income. The longer the useful life of an
asset, the smaller the annual depreciation allowance will be relative to the
original investment. Conversely, a shorter useful life enables the taxpayer to
deduct a greater portion of the original investment from her income. Assuming
that a taxpayer has enough taxable income to offset, a shorter depreciation
schedule will generally be of greater net present value to her.
The federal tax code's Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(MACRS) classifies wind, solar, and a range of other renewable power
generation assets as five-year property.55 The current generation of wind
turbines and solar photovoltaic equipment has a useful life of twenty or more
56years, often backed by corresponding manufacturer warranties. Without
favorable MACRS treatment, these renewable power assets would need to be
depreciated over relatively long periods of twenty or more years. MACRS
allows taxpayers to deduct the entire depreciation allowance of their renewable
power asset over the course of only five years, thereby providing a tax
incentive to invest in renewable energy.
During the 2008-2009 recession, the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 20085 sought to provide temporary relief to the struggling renewable
energy market by offering a fifty percent first-year bonus depreciation for
eligible investments. Taxpayers were allowed to deduct half of their qualifying
renewables investments from their income in the first year and the remainder
52. See infra Section I.A.
53. See infra Section I.B.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 167 (2012). For a general discussion, see PHILIP BROWN & MOLLY F.
SHERLOCK, CONG. RES. SERV., R41635, ARRA SECTION 1603 GRANTS IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY: OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 4 (2011). See also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, PUBL'N 946, HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY 9 (2013).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(vi)(I).
56. See, e.g., Paul Schwabe et al., Mobilizing Public Markets to Finance Renewable
Energy Projects: Insights from Expert Stakeholders, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 4
(2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl2osti/55021.pdf.
57. This accelerated depreciation incentive is not unique to renewable power generation
but also available to a wide range of other assets, including cars, qualified technological equipment,
eligible fanning machinery, and other assets. For details, see 26 U.S.C. § 168(e)(3)(B). For a broader
discussion of accelerated depreciation as an incentive to stimulate economic growth, see THOMAS L.
HUNGERFORD & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R41034, BUSINESS INVESTMENT AND
EMPLOYMENT TAX INCENTIVES TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY (2010).
58. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
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over the following four years. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 200959 and the Small Business Jobs Act of 20106 extended the first-year
bonus depreciation through 2010. Under the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 201061 first-year bonus
depreciation was expanded to one hundred percent for qualifying renewables
facilities placed in service through 2011 and extended for facilities placed in
service through 2012 at the previous fifty percent bonus depreciation rate for
the first year. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 201262 extended the fifty
percent first-year bonus depreciation for qualifying renewable energy assets
through 2013.
B. Tax Credits for Renewable Energy
Federal tax credits seek to promote the deployment of renewable energy
technologies by rewarding either the generation of electricity from
renewables 63 or the investment in equipment for renewable power generation.
When the 2008-2009 recession stalled renewable energy deployment and
threatened to put thousands of American workers in planning, manufacturing,
construction, maintenance and other segments of the renewables industry out of
work, Congress created the section 1603 cash grant as a temporary alternative
to the federal tax credit regime. 65
1. The Production Tax Credit
The Energy Policy Act of 199266 established production tax credits as the
primary federal incentive for wind energy.67 Today, the federal tax code offers
production tax credits to a range of renewable power generation technologies,
including wind, biomass, geothermal, landfill gas, municipal solid waste,
qualified hydropower as well as marine and hydrokinetic facilities. Eligible
facilities receive tax credits in proportion to the quantity of electricity they
produce. The inflation-indexed credit presently amounts to $23 for every
megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity produced from wind, geothermal, and
closed-loop biomass while other eligible technologies receive credit in the
59. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
60. Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504.
61. Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
62. Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
63. See infra Subsection 1.B.1.
64. See infra Subsection 1.B.2.
65. See infra Subsection 1.B.3.
66. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
67. See Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 1. For details regarding the legislative history
of the production tax credit, see CONG. RES. SERV., 109TH CONG., TAX EXPENDIThURES: COMPENDIUM
OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS (2006) (Comm. Print 109-072),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31188/pdf/CPRT-109SPRT31188.pdf.
68. See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
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amount of $11 per MWh.69 In addition to the market price for electricity, a
qualifying renewable energy project therefore earns $23 or $11 in tax credits
per MWh of electricity produced and sold to the grid.70
Production tax credits are available for a total of ten years as long as
certain requirements are met. For instance, generated power must be sold to an
unrelated party.71 In addition, renewable power generators are limited in their
ability to combine production tax credits with other public policy incentives,
such as grants, tax-exempt bonds, and other federal tax credits.72 Finally, the
production of renewable electricity must be attributable to the taxpayer by
virtue of and in proportion to its ownership interest in the renewable energy
facility and its gross sales.73 Since its inception, the production tax credit has
been subject to frequent, generally short-term extensions and occasional
lapses.74 Following its latest extension through the American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012, 7 the production tax credit expired at the end of 2013. Whether it
76
ought to be renewed has been hotly contested.
2. The Investment Tax Credit
Investment tax credits for renewables were first established by the Energy
Tax Act of 1978.77 Today the federal tax code provides investment tax credits
for a variety of renewable energy technologies, including solar, combined heat
78and power, fuel cells, microturbines, geothermal, and small wind projects. In
contrast to the production tax credit, the investment tax credit does not reward
the actual generation of electricity from eligible renewable technologies but,
rather, investment in the equipment required to generate renewable power.
Solar, fuel cells, and small wind projects receive tax credits equal to thirty
69. See Credit for Renewable Electricity Production, Refined Coal Production, and
Indian Coal Production, and Publication of Inflation Adjustment Factors and Reference Prices for
Calendar Year 2013, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,177 (Apr. 3, 2013) (showing the latest inflation adjustment as of
April 2013 in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 45(e)(2)).
70. The project's overall revenue will likely be further increased by proceeds from the
sale of its renewable energy certificates, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
71. 26 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)(B).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 45(b)(3); see also Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 1.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 45(e)(3).
74. BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 4.
75. Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
76. See, e.g., Oversight of the Wind Energy Production Tax Credit: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy Pol y, Health Care, & Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 113th Cong. 3, 8 (2013) (statement of Dan W. Reicher, Professor, Stanford Law School),
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 0/Reicher.pdf (arguing for renewal with gradual
phase-down); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Subsidizing the Green Theology of Wind Energy Tax Credits, 141
TAX NOTES 767, 769 (2013) (arguing against renewal).
77. Pub. L. No 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174. For details regarding the legislative history of
federal investment tax credits for renewable energy, see TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 67, at 185-90.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 48.
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percent of the project's qualifying investment costs, whereas all other eligible
technologies receive tax credits worth ten percent of their qualifying costs.79
While the investment tax credit is realized in full the same year a project
begins commercial operation, the credit vests linearly over a period of five
years. As a result, any transfer of ownership before the end of this period
leads to recapture of the unvested portion of the credit under the Internal
Revenue Code.8 ' Thus, if a project owner sells her assets after two years, she
will need to pay back sixty percent of the investment tax credit she received
when the project was placed in service. After January 1, 2017 the investment
tax credit will phase down to ten percent of qualifying costs for all eligible
renewable energy technologies to anticipate and encourage the industry's
continuous technology learning and cost improvements. 82
3. The Section 1603 Cash Grant
The 2008-2009 recession presented a serious challenge for renewable
energy project developers who were already struggling to raise capital for new
projects. Many developers do not have tax bills that are high enough to reap the
full and immediate benefits of tax credits for renewable energy.83 While
renewable power plants do not incur the same fuel costs as their fossil fuel
counterparts, they require greater up-front capital expenditures for planning,
construction, and equipment. As a result, it typically takes ten or more years
before a renewable power project has recovered these expenditures and begins
to generate the necessary profits and tax liability to use its tax credits. In the
case of a standalone wind project, for example, this lack of tax liabilities means
that the developer may realize only one third of the value of her project's tax
benefits. 8 Except for the rare instance where a project developer happens to
79. 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 50(a)(1)(B).
81. 26 U.S.C. § 50(a)(1)(A).
82. 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A)(ii).
83. See Bolinger et al., supra note 48, at 6804; Corneli, supra note 21, at 13;
BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 9; Renewable Energy Project Finance in the U.S.: 2010-
2013 Overview and Future Outlook, MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES. 25 (2012),
http://www.mintz.com/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Entryld=23 I &Portalld=0&
DownloadMethod=attachment; see also John P. Harper et al., Wind Project Financing Structures: A
Review & Comparative Analysis, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LABORATORY 2, 7, 38 (2007),
http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%201bnl%20-%2063434.pdf (noting that only a handful of
large developers are able to make use of the federal tax credits).
84. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at i (comparing up-front capital expenditures
relative to generation capacity).
85. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 8. For a wind project, for example, it
takes approximately twelve years to fully work through net operating losses from depreciation
deductions before the project even begins to generate the taxable income required to be able to self-
monetize available tax credits. See Bolinger et al., supra note 48, at 6811.
86. See Uday Varadarajan et al., Supporting Renewables While Saving Taxpayers
Money, CLIMATE POL'Y INITIATIVE 4 (2012), http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012
/09/Supporting-Renewables-while-Saving-Taxpayers-Money.pdf.
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have enough tax liability from other sources to offset, the developer will need
to bring in an outside investor with enough tax liability from other income. The
outside investor's participation, commonly referred to as tax equity investment,
enables the developer to monetize the project's tax credits in a timely fashion.87
Such tax equity investment effectively allows a renewable energy project to sell
the tax credits that the project itself cannot presently monetize against its own
income to the tax equity investor.8 8
Historically, fewer than two dozen highly profitable and sophisticated
entities-mostly large banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms-
have been willing and able to support renewable energy projects through their
tax equity investments. It was these financial firms that were hit particularly
hard by the 2008-2009 financial crisis, leading many to pare back their tax
equity investment activities or leave the tax equity market altogether, in some
cases permanently. 90 As a result, the number of tax equity investors dropped
from twenty to eleven investors between 2007 and 2009, while the available tax
equity volume for renewable energy investment shrank by over eighty percent
from $6.1 billion in 2007 to $1.2 billion in 2009.91
In response to these challenges, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 200992 created the section 1603 cash grant to "temporarily fill the gap
created by the diminished investor demand for tax credits" and to achieve the
near-term goal of "creating and retaining jobs ... as well as ... expanding the
use of clean and renewable energy and decreasing our dependency on non-
renewable energy sources."93 The section 1603 cash grant gave eligible
renewable energy developers the option to receive a cash grant from the
Department of Treasury for up to thirty percent of their qualifying costs in lieu
of their traditional production or investment tax credits.94 Following extension
through the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
87. See, e.g., Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 2. Carrying forward tax credits for
use against a project's future tax liability significantly reduces the credits' net present value to
renewable power developers. See supra note 3 1.
88. For more details on the mechanics of tax equity investment in renewable energy
projects, see infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. See also BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54,
at 17.
89. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 10.
90. See Bolinger et al., supra note 48, at 6804.
91. See Scott Fisher et al., Tax Credits, Tax Equity and Alternatives to Spur Clean
Energy Financing, U.S. PARTNERSHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN. 2 (2011), http://uspref.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2011/09/Tax-Credits-Tax-Equity-for-Clean-Energy-Financing.pdf.
92. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
93. Payments for Specifed Energy Property in Lieu of Tax Credits Under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 3 (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initia
tives/recovery/Documents/GUIDANCE.pdf; see also Staff of Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations,
Where Are the Jobs?-The Elusiveness of Job Creation Under the Section 1603 Grant Program for
Renewable Energy, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. 3 (2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/r
epublicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/20120618greenjobs.pdf.
94. U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, supra note 93, at 2.
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Creation Act of 2010, 9 the section 1603 cash grant was available to qualifying
projects that were placed in service or started construction from 2009 through
2011.96
While the section 1603 cash grant has expired, its legacy lives on.97 The
grant provides a powerful counterfactual against which to evaluate the efficacy
and efficiency of federal tax credits for the promotion of renewable energy. The
following sections of this Article will draw on the Department of Treasury's
real-life experimentation with the alternative availability of tax credits and cash
grants to explore which of the two Petri dishes in the energy policy lab yielded
better results.
II. Taking Stock of the Efficacy and Efficiency of Tax Credits
The jury appears to be hung in its attempt to reach a verdict on the past
success and future fate of tax credits for renewable energy. Support comes
mostly from within the industry. Speaking for over 1200 member companies,
the American Wind Energy Association praises the production tax credit as "an
effective tool to keep electricity rates low and encourage development of
proven renewable energy projects" adding that "it is crucial that it be
,,98extended. Representing roughly 1000 member companies, the Solar Energy
Industries Association hails the investment tax credit as "the cornerstone of
continued growth of solar energy in the United States"99 and "one of the most
important federal policy mechanisms to support the deployment of solar energy
in the United States."'0
Policy and financial analysts paint a less favorable picture of federal tax
credit support for renewable energy. Analysts with Bloomberg New Energy
Finance find that a cash subsidy in lieu of tax credits "offers US taxpayers a
better bang for their buck."'' Comparing the section 1603 cash grant to the
production tax credit, researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
reach a similar conclusion, highlighting the cash grant's greater value to project
95. Pub. L.No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
96. For developer strategies to ensure section 1603 cash grant eligibility by buying
equipment ahead of time, see CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 35.
97. For an overview of grant allocations across various renewable energy technologies
and projects, see MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 33. For a critical discussion of the
section 1603 grant's impact on job creation, see Staff of Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations,
supra note 93, at 7.
98. See Federal Production Tax Credit, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N (2012),
http://aweablog.org/uploads/files/FederalPTCforWindEnergy.pdf.
99. See Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS'N,
http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit (last visited May 15, 2014).
100. Id.
101. See Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 1.
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developers.102 Even the Congressional Research Service notes that "[s]ection
1603 grants may be a more economically efficient mechanism than tax credits
for delivering benefits to the renewable energy sector." 0 3 Similarly, the
Bipartisan Policy Center finds that "while the tax-based incentive system has
been enormously supportive for the renewable energy industry, it is also a sub-
optimal tool and will likely be unsustainable as the industry matures."' The
terminology employed by both sides suggests that the differing views may be
the result of different foci-one on the efficacy, os the other on the
efficiency to-of tax credits for renewable energy.
A. The Efficacy of Tax Credits for Renewable Energy
To accurately measure the efficacy of a particular policy to promote the
deployment of renewable energy is no simple task. A wide range of factors
require careful consideration, from resource endowment to market conditions to
the interplay with other, complementary policies.1o7 In the United States, for
instance, federal tax credits are complemented by accelerated depreciation
rates 08 as well as a variety of state policies to promote the deployment of
renewable energy, from renewable portfolio standards1 09 to, more recently,
feed-in tariffs.o10 To develop and execute a methodology to accurately quantify
the efficacy of federal tax credits for renewable energy is beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, historical data on the deployment of renewable energy
capacity shall serve as a proxy for policy efficacy, using solar and wind as
representative technologies.11
Since the Energy Policy Act of 2005112 established the solar investment
tax credit in its current form, annual solar photovoltaic capacity additions in the
United States have steadily risen from 79 megawatts (MW) in 2005 to 160 MW
in 2007, 435 MW in 2009, 1887 MW in 2011, and to a record 3313 MW of
102. See Bolinger et al., supra note 48, at 6818 ("[F]or an average wind power project,
the value of self-sheltering the [section 1603] grant rather than the PTC comes to around eight percent of
installed project costs.").
103. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 30.
104. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 13.
105. See infra Section II.A.
106. See infra Section II.B.
107. For an introduction to the complexity and challenges of measuring and comparing
renewable energy policy efficacy, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 2008, supra note 42, at 87; see also
Deploying Renewables: Best and Future Policy Practice, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 108 (2011),
http://www.ica.org/publications/freepublications/publication/DeployingRenewables20l I.pdf
[hereinafter INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 2011].
108. See supra Section l.A.
109. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
111. Together, solar and wind account for more than ninety percent of U.S. renewable
power generation capacity additions between 2000 and 2012. See Gelman, supra note 25.
112. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
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new capacity additions in 2012.1 Wind power, meanwhile, has had a more
varied deployment record since the Energy Policy Act of 1992 created the
production tax credit for wind. 114 Repeated expirations of the tax credit,
followed by eventual renewals, led to a series of boom-and-bust cycles in new
capacity installations in the late 1990s and early 2000s.1s Since 2005, annual
wind capacity additions have risen from 2374 MW in 2005 to 5252 MW in
2007 and 10,003 MW in 2009 before dropping to 5215 MW in 2010 and then
rising again to 6647 MW in 2011 and a record 13,077 MW of wind capacity
additions in 2012.116
The deployment data for both wind and solar power generation capacity
suggest that tax credits have indeed been effective at promoting the deployment
of renewable energy in the United States. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the
tax credits' efficacy flows from the boom-and-bust cycles that have followed
the periodic lapses and renewals of the production tax credit for wind. As
control events, these cycles confirm the production tax credit's importance for
the wind industry and, hence, its efficacy in promoting the deployment of wind
energy in the United States. The solar and wind industry associations' highly
positive views of federal tax credits for renewable energy, therefore, appear to
reflect both associations' business-oriented focus on the efficacy rather than
efficiency of tax credits.
B. The Efficiency of Tax Credits for Renewable Energy
Policy and financial analysts tend to ask not only how much steel tax
credits and other renewable energy policies manage to put in the ground but,
critically, at what cost. Every year, the Joint Committee on Taxation examines
the cost of tax credits for renewable energy in its tax expenditure report for the
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance.117 For fiscal years 2013-2017, federal tax expenditures associated with
the investment and production tax credits for renewable energy are estimated at
$2.9 billion and $9.7 billion respectively.' 18 Accounting for $2.4 billion over
the five-year period, solar projects are the main beneficiaries of the investment
113. See U.S. Solar Market Insight 2012 Year in Review, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. AsS'N
5(2013).
114. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
115. The production tax credit was allowed to expire at the end of 1999, 2001, and
2003, respectively. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 8.
116. Calculations based on A WEA U.S. Wind Industry Annual Market Report 2012:
Rankings, AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N (2013), http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/AWE
A%20U%20S%20%20Wind%201ndustry%/o2OAnnual%2OMarket%2ORankings%202012.pdf.
117. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 (Joint Comm. Print 2013),
http://www.jet.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4503&chk=4503&nohtml.
118. Id. at 31.
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tax credit, while wind projects weigh in at $7.7 billion, receiving more
production tax credits than all other renewable energy technologies together.119
In combination with past deployment data and future projections, the
estimated federal expenditures associated with tax credits allow for an
approximation of how much it costs American taxpayers to deploy a megawatt
of new wind, solar, or other renewable power generation capacity. But to judge
whether the resulting cost-per-capacity estimate is efficient or not tends to be
rather difficult without knowing the counterfactual. Traditionally, international
cross-country policy comparisons have had to serve as the counterfactual
against which to assess the relative cost efficiency of competing renewable
energy policies.120 Renewable energy markets, however, vary considerably at
national, regional, and even local levels regarding, for example, the ease of
project development, resource endowment, cost of capital, and other critical
market conditions.121 The more two countries differ in these aspects, the more
difficult it becomes to compare the cost efficiency of their respective renewable
energy policies. Replacing the comparative international counterfactual with an
intertemporal national counterfactual promises little more accuracy. As
experiential policy learning leads countries to change their policies to promote
renewable energy, so do technology cost and performance, macro-economic
development, environmental regulation, and other key parameters of renewable
markets change over time. 122 Without the ability to control for these changes,
the intertemporal efficiency comparison of two or more renewable energy
policies may well yield misleading results.
Fortunately for the United States, the section 1603 cash grant has created
the rare situation of a counterfactual to renewable energy tax credits that not
only applies to the same geographic market but also, critically, at the same
time.123 At the request of the bipartisan National Commission on Energy
Policy, Bloomberg New Energy Finance has used the section 1603 experience
to examine and compare the relative cost efficiency of federal tax credits and
cash grants for the promotion of renewable energy deployment.124 In particular,
Bloomberg's analysts were asked to assess "how efficiently [tax credits] put
taxpayer resources to work" and whether "cash deployed in place of the credits
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 2008, supra note 42, at 90; INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY 2011, supra note 107, at 111.
121. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 2008, supra note 42, at 91 (noting that even a
sophisticated comparison of renewable power remuneration levels should only serve as an indication of
actual remuneration levels); INT'L ENERGY AGENCY 2011, supra note 107, at 113.
122. For an overview of renewable policy shifts, see INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra
note 42, at 94; and INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 107, at 147.
123. As pointed out earlier, the section 1603 cash grant gave renewable energy
developers a choice between conventional tax credits and the newly established cash grants. See
Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 1.
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[could] have a greater impact."l25 Following further guidance from the expert
members of the National Commission on Energy Policy, Bloomberg focused its
analysis on a comparison between the production tax credit for wind and a cash
grant such as that offered under section 1603.126
Bloomberg began its analysis by calculating the total liability that the
federal government incurred through its production tax credit support for new
wind capacity added from 2005 through 2008.127 Assuming an average capacity
factor of thirty-three percent,128 Bloomberg concluded that, over the ten-year
period of a project's eligibility for production tax credits,129 the total federal
liability for the roughly 19 GW of new wind capacity amounted to over
$10 billion.130 To estimate how much it would have cost the federal
government to deploy the same amount of wind power capacity using the
section 1603 cash grant, Bloomberg proceeded with a bottom-up analysis that
compared the financing costs of two industry-typical but hypothetical wind
farms. Both farms have a 100 MW nameplate capacity, but one receives federal
subsidies in the form production tax credits and MACRS accelerated
depreciation while the other receives only a cash grant akin to that offered
under section 1603. 1 The two subsidy scenarios allow for different financing
structures, eliminating among other things the need for tax equity in the cash
grant scenario.132 Using standard industry yields for the various types of project
capital, 133 Bloomberg found that the cash grant option would allow developers
and investors to meet their respective return requirements at approximately half
the cost to the federal government of the tax credit scenario.' 34 Applying these
findings to the 19 GW of new wind capacity installed from 2005 through 2008,
Bloomberg's analysis concluded that the use of cash grants instead of tax
incentives would have allowed the federal government to achieve the same
deployment success at a cost of $5 billion in cash grants as opposed to over
125. Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 1.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 4.
128. For wind turbines and other power generation facilities, the capacity factor is used
to measure how often and how long a generator runs delivering how much of its nameplate maximum
capacity. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=187&t-3 (last visited May 15, 2014). Based on historical
performance data, Bloomberg's capacity factor assumptions imply that a wind turbine with a nameplate
capacity, i.e., a maximum output capacity of 2 MW, will, on average, generate 5780 MWh of electricity
per year. This annual output represents thirty-three percent of the turbine's theoretical maximum output
capacity of 17,520 MWh if it were to run at full capacity (2 MW) for all 8,760 hours of the year.
129. See supra Subsection I.B.1.
130. Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 4.
131. Id.
132. For the necessity to include tax equity investment to benefit from federal tax
incentives, see supra Subsection I.B.3.
133. In the Bloomberg study, these included sponsor equity, tax equity, and project-
level debt See Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 5.
134. Id.
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$10 billion of federal liability in tax incentives. 135 As Bloomberg's analysts put
it: "One dollar in cash has, on average, gone twice as far as one dollar of tax
credits in subsidizing wind."136
Bloomberg's analysis offers a powerful illustration of the sizeable
efficiency differential between production tax credits and cash incentives for
renewable energy but the study sheds only limited light on the underlying
reasons. The different medium (cash vs. tax credit) through which federal
support for renewables is delivered likely represents but one of several factors
that, together, create the observed efficiency delta. Another, critical factor is the
extent to which the value of federal subsidies depends on project
performance-in other words, whether the subsidy assigns a project's
performance risk to the developer and its investors or to the government and its
taxpayers. The production tax credit on the one hand, and the investment tax
credit and section 1603 cash grant on the other hand, vary distinctly in their
allocation of project performance risk. The overall dollar value of a wind
project's production tax credits depends on how much power the project
generates, with each kilowatt-hour of electricity earning the project or, rather,
its tax equity investor, 2.3 cents of tax credit. With her tax credit earning
prospects inseparably linked to the project's electricity output, the tax equity
investor effectively assumes part of the project's performance risk. Following
basic investment intuition that higher risk requires higher returns, industry
practice has shown that tax equity investors in wind power projects exact
higher premiums to compensate for their assumption of project performance
risk. "
By comparison, the overall dollar value of a solar project's investment tax
credit depends not on the project's output performance but, instead, on the
value of its up-front expenditures, earning tax equity investors tax credits worth
thirty percent of these expenditures. Even if the project were to break down one
week after it is put into service, the tax equity investor could still claim her
investment tax credit. With the tax equity investor's earning prospects largely
decoupled from the project's performance, developers of solar and other
renewable power projects financed with federal investment tax credits pay less
of a performance risk premium for tax equity. The section 1603 grant
resembles the investment tax credit insofar as it, too, attaches to a project's up-
front expenditures, paying cash support in the amount of thirty percent of these
expenditures-regardless of the project's eventual performance. These
differences in performance risk allocation across the production tax credit, the
investment tax credit, and the section 1603 grant suggest that the Bloomberg
study's observed efficiency differential between the production tax credit and
the section 1603 cash grant was partly prompted by the cash grant's
135. Id. at 1.
136. Id.
137. See Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 11.
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independence from project performance, reducing the overall exposure of
developers and investors to performance risk. To measure what share of the
cash grant's comparative efficiency advantages over the production tax credit is
attributable to risk allocation and how much to the subsidy medium (cash vs.
tax credit) would require adding an investment tax credit scenario to
Bloomberg's analysis. Comparing the existing production tax credit scenario
and the new investment tax credit scenario could offer some measure of the
efficiency differential attributable to the two tax incentives' respective
performance risk allocations. Meanwhile, a direct comparison between the
investment tax credit scenario and the cash grant scenario could help to reveal
what measure of efficiency gains is attributable to the substitution of cash for
tax credit subsidies.
Bloomberg's analysis may not offer the aforementioned, desired level of
granularity, but the study's findings receive strong empirical support from the
renewable industry's response to the section 1603 cash grant. Given the choice
between the production tax credit, the investment tax credit and the cash grant,
renewable energy developers overwhelmingly opted for cash instead of
credits. Together with Bloomberg's data, this trend suggests that, at the same
face value as the corresponding investment tax credit, the section 1603 cash
grant may have offered windfall benefits to renewable energy project
developers. 139 At the very least, the analytical and empirical experiences with
the section 1603 cash grant's counterfactual to tax credits cast serious doubt on
the relative cost efficiency of federal tax credit support for renewable energy
deployment.
It is crucial for federal budgeting to ensure that taxpayers receive the
greatest possible bang for their buck, whether it be in the context of tax
expenditures for health care, national security, or renewable energy. 140 To
validate whether federal tax credits for renewable energy are, indeed, as
inefficient and ripe for reform as the section 1603 counterfactual suggests, the
138. See Bolinger et al., supra note 48, at 6806 (noting that nearly two thirds of all
wind capacity additions in 2009 chose the cash grant over the tax credit option); see also MINTZ LEVIN
& GTM RES., supra note 83, at 8 (pointing to industry estimates that sixty-five percent to eighty-five
percent of utility-scale wind projects opted to elect the cash grant over tax credits). The industry's strong
preference for cash in lieu of both production and investment tax credits suggests that the respective
subsidies' linkage to performance risk are, in fact, less of a factor than the medium of subsidy support
(cash vs. tax credit).
139. Average lead times of two or more years for large-scale project development
suggest that some share of the projects that eventually opted for the section 1603 cash grant had
originally budgeted based on federal tax credit support for their renewable power deployment. For an
overview ofthe wind project development timeline, see Wayne Walker, An Overview ofthe Wind Power
Project Development Process and Financial Performance of Wind Energy Projects, WAYNE WALKER
CONSERVATION CONSULTING LLC 21 (2008), http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/past
meetingpresentations/walker.pdf
140. See, e.g., Batchelder et al., supra note 31, at 46 (arguing that a Pigouvian "subsidy
should be targeted in such a way that society gets the most 'bang for its buck"').
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following section will explore and assess the potential shortcomings of tax
credit support for renewables.
III. Deciphering the Deficits of Tax Credits for Renewables
The section 1603 cash grant experience reveals that tax credits deliver a
significantly lower level of support to renewable energy developers than a cash
grant subsidy of equal face value. This observation should give pause not only
to the renewables industry but, critically, to the federal government and its
taxpayers. From the government's perspective, the efficiency of a subsidy can
also be measured based on the proportion of the subsidy that actually reaches
and supports the targeted activity or industry. 141 In the case of tax credits for
renewables, it appears as though only a fraction of the subsidy value actually
finds its way into the pockets of the developers who drive the large-scale
deployment of new renewable power capacity. But where does the remainder of
the subsidy value go? In other words, if taxpayers get so much less bang, i.e.,
so much less renewables deployment, for their buck from tax credits than from
cash grants, where do their tax dollars go?
The answer to these questions hinges on the mismatch between the
inherent profitability requirements of non-refundable tax credits and the
revenue profile of the renewable energy projects they are intended to promote.
This mismatch requires renewable energy developers to bring in outside
investors whose hefty tax bills allow them to monetize the federal tax credits.142
But these tax equity investors are few and far between-and they exploit their
exclusivity status to charge a premium for their involvement.143 The tax equity
market's cyclical nature further reduces the value of tax credits when
developers need them most.'" To make matters worse, the tax code renders tax
equity for renewable energy a highly illiquid investment thereby hindering the
formation of secondary markets that could help developers refinance their
projects in the near to mid-term.145 In addition, participation of a tax equity
investor in renewable power projects requires complex and costly deal
structures that drive up transaction costs.146 The need to bring in a tax equity
investor, finally, limits a developer's ability to raise project capital from other,
more cost-efficient sources.147
141. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 22.
142. See infra Section III.A.
143. See infra Section III.B.
144. See infra Section III.C.
145. See infra Section III.D.
146. See infra Section III.E.
147. See infra Section III.F.
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A. Tax Credits Require Taxable Profits-or Tax Equity
Federal tax credits were used to stimulate economic development long
before renewable energy entered the scene in the wake of the 1970s energy
crisis.148 It may have seemed logical to federal policymakers, therefore, to use
the same tried-and-true tool to promote the development of renewable energy
when they established today's regime of tax credits for wind, solar, and other
renewables.149 In doing so, however, policymakers were willing to overlook the
fact that renewable energy developers and their projects tend to lack the
quintessential requirement to benefit from tax credits-a high enough tax bill to
offset with these credits.150
For most of the 1990s, a renewable energy developer's best way out of
this lack-of-taxable-income dilemma was to develop a project to the point of
construction and then sell it to a bigger entity that not only enjoyed access to
the capital necessary for construction to proceed but also had a tax bill large
enough to use the project's tax credits.'' More recently, developers who are
unwilling to give up ownership or management of their projects but lack the
taxable income to use the tax credits themselves have turned to third-party
investors for tax equity capital.152
Tax equity is a hybrid investment position that combines characteristics of
conventional debt and equity stakes.'53 Like traditional equity, tax equity bears
the ultimate performance risk of a project. Like debt, tax equity receives
preferential treatment regarding project cash flows. These include positive cash
flows such as payments under a power purchase agreement with a local utility
or other off-taker and, most importantly, negative cash flows in the form of tax
credits and other benefits that the tax equity investor can use to offset her tax
liabilities outside of the project.154 In essence, the tax equity investor's capital
contribution buys her the rights to the project's tax benefits-and helps the
developer finance the project's high up-front capital expenditures. Bringing in a
148. In 1962, investment tax credits were introduced as a permanent subsidy, later to be
used as a counter-cyclical measure. See HUNGERFORD & GRAVELLE, supra note 57, at 7.
149. For a discussion of the evolution of today's renewable energy tax credits, see
supra Subsection I.B.l.
150. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 1; Harper et al., supra note 83; supra notes 85-
88 and accompanying text. Challenges related to tax credits' inherent profitability requirements are not
unique to renewable energy deployment. Start-up companies and other economic ventures with high
upfront capital expenditures and modest revenue flows over a long period of time will struggle to use tax
incentives, such as accelerated depreciation and tax credits, in a timely fashion. See Warren &
Auerbach, supra note 29, at 1758-61; see also Batchelder et al., supra note 31, at 55 ("[T]he value of a
tax incentive generally should not vary by the size of one's lifetime earnings, whether one earns more
earlier or later in the life cycle, or whether one's earnings are more smooth or more volatile over time.").
151. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at 2, 6.
152. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 8; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra
note 83, at 13.
153. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 17.
154. See id.; Corneli, supra note 21, at 13; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21,
at 9.
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tax equity investor enables a renewable power project to monetize its otherwise
useless tax credits, albeit at a discount.155
B. Tax Equity is Scarce and Expensive
The need for renewable energy developers to partner with tax equity
investors in order to reap the benefits of their project's tax credits might pose
less of a challenge if such tax equity capital were readily available. Only a tiny
fraction of the investment community, however, meets the profitability
requirements to use its own tax bills to monetize a renewable project's tax
156credits. Tax equity investment is a niche market that appeals only to the
largest and most sophisticated financial firms, such as investment banks and
insurance companies whose exclusive status gives them a strong financial but
little if any strategic interest in renewables deployment.'57 Meanwhile, billions
of dollars of institutional capital from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds,
and other potential investors are sidelined by the tax code.158 And even those
few eligible financial firms do not always have the necessary profits or tax
appetite to invest in tax equity for renewables, as evidenced by the 2008-2009
economic downturn. Between 2007 and 2009, the pool of tax equity investors
shrank from twenty to eleven investors, as the available tax equity for
renewable energy plummeted by over eighty percent from $6.1 billion in 2007
to only $1.2 billion in 2009.15
More recent trends and projections suggest little improvement in the
availability of tax equity for renewable energy, notwithstanding the recent
market entry of non-traditional tax investors such as Google.160 Despite an
overall deal volume of $6 billion for solar and wind tax equity in 2011, the
market counted little more than twenty active tax equity investors.' Even with
continuing economic recovery, the tax equity market is unlikely to grow
significantly beyond its current size given the highly specialized nature of tax
equity investment.162 Among other qualifications, investors must have
155. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 8, 17. The discount stems from the
premium that tax equity investors charge for their participation in renewable energy projects. For more
details, see infra Section III.B.
156. See Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 10; Corneli, supra note 21, at 13; Fisher et
al., supra note 91, at 1; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 9, 11; MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES.,
supra note 83, at 18.
157. Harper et al., supra note 83, at 25; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83,
at 14, 19.
158. See Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Op-Ed., How to Make Renewable Energy
Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/opinion/how-to-make-rene
wable-energy-competitive.html.
159. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 2; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21,
at 10.
160. See MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 7, 19.
161. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 29.
162. See Mendelsohn & Feldman, supra note 34, at 2.
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substantial current and future tax liability, the financial acumen to participate in
a complex project structure, and the willingness to invest in illiquid assets that
tie up cash and cannot easily be resold.163 A comparative glance at Europe's
renewable energy investment scene reveals just how high a barrier to entry the
federal tax credit regime has erected for America's renewable energy
investment market: thanks to feed-in tariffs and other deployment incentives
that do not hinge on tax equity, more than 140 project financers compete for a
stake in the similarly sized European market for renewable power projects.
With only a fraction of the investment community in play, project developers in
the United States find themselves in fierce competition with one another over
the constrained supply of coveted tax equity.1 In the words of one major tax
equity investor: "[T]he tax equity investors hold all the cards."16
Competition among developers for a spot at the tax equity trough is not
necessarily a bad thing. In fact, some credit competitive pressure with serving
as a catalyst for the development of higher quality renewable power projects
with more thorough due diligence and better risk management.167 The members
of the elite club of tax equity investors, however, exploit their exclusivity not
only to improve the quality of renewable energy projects but also to exact a
sizeable premium for their participation.168 While long-term project debt and
conventional equity capital are readily available at modest yield rates of five to
six percent and seven to eight percent respectively, tax equity investors demand
up to fifteen percent or more for their involvement in renewable power
projects.169 According to Rhone Resch, head of the Solar Energy Industries
Association, the premium yield rates demanded by tax equity investors require
developers to sell their tax credits at a loss of 30 to 50 cents on the dollar.170
More conservative analyses conclude that the need to bring in a tax equity
investor adds up to 800 basis points, or 8 percentage points, to a project's
financing costs when compared to the typical cost of project finance debt. 7 1
163. Id. To make matters worse, from a developer's perspective, not every one of these
tax equity investors will be interested in every renewable power project since many investors have what
industry experts describe as "esoteric requirements, specific needs, or quirks." CHADBOURNE & PARKE
LLP, supra note 51, at 29.
164. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 11.
165. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 13; Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 1;
MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 8.
166. CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 37.
167. Id. ("No one closes over mistakes any more. No one closes over anything any
more. Sponsors must fix everything.").
168. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 18; Harper et al., supra note 83, at v;
MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 8.
169. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 2 (based on pre-tax yield rates); see also Harper
et al., supra note 83, at v; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at I1, 18; Zindler & Tringas,
supra note 21, at 5 (discussing the spread of tax equity investors' yield demands).
170. See Matthew L. Wald, Sunset for a Solar Subsidy?, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (Nov. 16,
2010, 3:53 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/sunset-for-a-solar-subsidy.
171. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 11; MtNTz LEVIN & GTM RES.,
supra note 83, at 8.
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With every 100 basis points estimated to add $2.50 to $5.00 per MWh of
renewable power output, 172 the steep cost of tax equity imposes a sizeable
burden on the renewable energy industry as it struggles to become cost-
competitive with coal, gas, and other fossil fuel incumbents. For American
taxpayers, the premium yields for tax equity divert up to half of their tax dollars
away from the wind farms and solar installations they were intended to
subsidize and into the pockets of Wall Street banks and other high-profit
corporations.
C. Tax Credits Fail When Needed Most
The cyclical nature of tax equity poses a separate, similarly grave problem
for renewable energy developers, the federal government, and its taxpayers.
The 2008-2009 economic downturn offers ample evidence of just how much
the availability and, with it, the price, of tax equity fluctuate with the overall
state of the economy.173 More specifically, "[m]acro-trends in tax equity
financing ... are highly correlated to the financial health of a limited number of
large financial institutions."1 74 This cyclicality challenge is compounded for the
ten-year production tax credit as it requires potential tax equity investors to
forecast their tax appetite, i.e., their ability to use a project's tax credits ten
years into the future.175 Even the very largest and most profitable financial
institutions cannot ensure sufficient levels of profitability through an economic
crisis, as evidenced by the 2008 departures of Citigroup, American
International Group, and others from the tax equity market.176
As a general matter, a slow economy will require renewable energy
developers to pay an even higher premium for tax equity, effectively selling
their tax credits at an even greater discount than usual. As a result, federal tax
incentives deliver less subsidy value to developers when the economy is slow.
The tax system is generally credited as an automatic stabilizer since
proportional and, especially, progressive taxes attenuate macroeconomic
shocks without the need for government intervention.177 With the availability
and price of tax equity heavily dependent on macroeconomic factors, however,
tax credits for renewables appear to have a downright "destabilizing" effect.
The section 1603 cash grant experience suggests that direct cash subsidies
for renewables are better suited than tax credits to smooth macroeconomic
shocks and fluctuations. True to its Congressional purpose, the section 1603
172. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 11 n.8.
173. See, e.g., id. at 10.
174. MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 3.
175. See Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at I1.
176. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 10.
177. See Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as
Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 37 (2000); Thomas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, Tax Reform
and Automatic Stabilization, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 590 (2002).
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grant helped developers "temporarily fill the gap created by the diminished
investor demand for tax credits." 178 Amidst one of the worst recessions in
recent history, the grant program enabled sustained deployment of wind energy
at pre-2008 levels and record deployment of solar energy between 2009 and
2011.179 No longer reliant on tax equity from financial institutions whose
profits and, hence, ability to absorb tax credits had been slashed by the
recession, renewable energy developers were free to raise project capital from
other sources, including sponsor equity and, critically, debt.'so The strong
deployment record suggests that these sources were less affected by the
recession, allowing them to stabilize economic activity in a fledgling industry.
In contrast, the destabilization effect of tax credits exacerbates the
renewable energy industry's existing struggles to become cost-competitive with
conventional sources of energy. After all, tax credits are designed to cover only
part of the cost of generating power from renewables, with the wholesale power
price and state incentives intended to bridge the remaining gap. A slow
economy, however, leads to an oversupply of electricity and thereby drives
down wholesale power prices, which, in turn, makes it harder for renewable
power generators to break even, let alone make a profit. 81 Tax credits,
therefore, fail renewable energy developers when they need them most to
bridge the widening gap between depressed wholesale power prices and their
generation costs.182 Ultimately, the cyclical nature of tax equity makes tax
credits for renewables a poor stimulus measure to promote the large-scale
deployment of renewable energy, much less strengthen or revive a struggling
economy.
D. Tax Credits Limit Investment Liquidity
The cyclicality challenges of tax equity are exacerbated by the tax code's
restrictions for the sale and transfer of tax equity stakes in renewable energy
projects.183 The investment tax credit for solar and other renewable projects, for
instance, becomes available in full in the year that the facility is placed into
service.' But the credit actually takes five years to linearly vest in its
entirety.'85 In other words, the tax equity investor must hold on to her stake in
178. U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, supra note 93, at 3.
179. See supra notes 113, 116 and accompanying text.
180. See infra Section III.F.
181. See Zindler & Tringas, supra note 21, at 6.
182. Existing projects may have locked in a higher price with a long-term power
purchase agreement. But the cyclicality challenge is substantial for new projects that need to secure a
lucrative power purchase agreement in a depressed wholesale power market. See id.
183. The tax code generally restricts the trafficking of tax attributes and incentives. See,
e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 382 (2012). For a discussion of the few tradable federal tax credits, see Clinton G.
Wallace, Note, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 227, 237 (2011).
184. Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at I1.
185. Id.
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the project for at least five years in order to realize the tax credit's full value. 86
If the investor decides to pull out of the project earlier, say after three years, the
non-vested portion of her tax credit, in this case forty percent, will be subject to
recapture and the associated tax savings will need to be paid back to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).187 The really bad news for investors and
developers alike is that, once recaptured, the non-vested portion of the tax
credit is lost for good and cannot be used to attract new investors for the
project. Originally intended to prevent tax shelter abuse, the tax code's
recapture provisions severely limit the fungibility of tax equity and thereby
impede the formation of a viable secondary market. Indeed, the only
evidence of meaningful secondary market transactions dates back to 2009 when
tax-advantaged investments were liquidated out of the portfolios of bankrupt
tax equity investors such as Lehman Brothers.190 In the words of an industry
insider: "These trades are hard to execute."' 91
In practice, the investment illiquidity that tax equity infuses into
renewable energy projects leaves developers with little to no recourse against
the cyclicality of tax equity, at least for projects that are subject to the tax
code's recapture rules. If a slow economy with an even thinner-than-usual tax
equity market forces a developer to pay an unusually high premium for the tax
investor's participation, the developer has little hope of mitigating the damage
once the economy has recovered by bringing in another tax equity investor at a
lower yield rate. Moreover, tax equity investors would likely lower the yield
premium they demand if their investments enjoyed greater liquidity allowing
them more and better exit options in the case of economic distress, reduced tax
appetite, or for strategic purposes.192
E. Tax Equity Requires Complex and Costly Deal Structures
Participation of a tax equity investor in a renewable energy project
requires highly complicated deal structures. In all of these structures, the tax
equity investor's capital contribution effectively buys her the rights to the
project's tax benefits so that she may use them to offset her tax liability from
other sources. But the tax code's general prohibition of trafficking in tax credits
186. Id.
187. See 26 U.S.C. § 50(a)(1)(B).
188. See Bolinger et al., supra note 21, at 11.
189. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at I1.
190. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 34.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Joel Meister, Sunny Dispositions: Modernizing Investment Tax Credit
Recapture Rules for Solar Energy Project Finance After the Stimulus, GEO. WASH. SOLAR INST. 18 &
n.85 (Sept. 2012), http://solar.gwu.edu/resources/sunny-dispositions-modemizing-investment-tax-credit
-recapture-rules-solar-energy-project ("'There is option value in being able to sell an asset whenever you
want. Frequently this is called the liquidity premium. . . .') (quoting E-mail from Matthew Meares, Dir.
of Project Fin., Amonix, Inc., to author (Aug. 11, 2011, 01:29 EST) (on file with author)).
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and other tax attributes193 rules out a straight-forward sale of these attributes
and, instead, requires inventive deal structures in order to legally assign what
would otherwise be the developer's tax benefits to the tax equity investor. The
three main tax equity structures in use today are the partnership flip, the sale-
leaseback, and the inverted lease.1 94
The partnership-flip structure was first used in large-scale transactions in
2003 and has since become the most common tax equity structure.195 In this
structure, the tax equity investor's capital contribution to the project makes her
the majority equity partner during the early years of the project partnership
when she receives most of the cash flows from power purchase payments and,
most importantly, the tax credits and other tax benefits. Once all or most of
the project's tax benefits have been realized and the tax equity investor's
capital stake has reached a pre-negotiated yield target, the tax investor's share
in the partnership "flips" to a minority position and the developer takes over in
terms of both equity and cash flows. 197 After the flip, the tax equity investor
typically retains a nominal equity interest in the project partnership as required
by the tax code.198 In essence, the partnership-flip structure allows the
developer to bring in a tax equity investor to serve as an "accommodation"
partner who receives a shorter maturity (and higher yield) on her investment in
exchange for the ability to monetize a project's tax benefits.199
In a sale-leaseback structure, the developer develops the project but sells
the tax credit earning equipment at fair market value to a tax equity investor
within 90 days of the project'.s being placed in service. 20o After the sale is
193. See 26 U.S.C. § 382 (2012).
194. See Dipa Sharif et al., The Return-and Returns-of Tax Equity for U.S.
Renewable Projects, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 11, 16 (2011) (offering a concise comparison
across all three tax equity structures); MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 10; CHADBOURNE
& PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 30. In 1981, Congress created "safe harbor leasing" which allowed for
the transfer of tax benefits under certain leasing conditions, but this officially endorsed structure was
short-lived. Public backlash against the allegedly abusive transfer of tax incentives between corporations
led Congress to repeal the safe harbor leasing provisions in 1982. See WALLACE, supra note 183, at 244-
46. For a detailed analysis of the benefits of safe harbor leasing, see Warren & Auerbach, supra note 29,
at 762.
195. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at 8, 25; CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note
51, at 35.
196. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 9; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES.,
supra note 83, at 16; see also Sharif et al., supra note 194, at 12 (demonstrating a more balanced
allocation of positive project cash flows between the developer and tax equity investor).
197. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at 23 (noting that after the flip typically around
ninety percent of cash flows goes to the developer); BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 9. At
this point, cash flows consist primarily if not exclusively of payments for electricity under the project's
power purchase agreement.
198. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at 19 (reporting on industry practice to leave five
percent of equity with the tax investor to avoid potential challenges from the IRS regarding the
allocation of tax benefits); MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 16.
199. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 9.
200. See MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 15. With the exception of
biomass facilities, the tax code's owner-operator requirement prohibits the use of sale-leaseback and
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executed, the tax equity investor who now owns the equipment leases it back to
the developer at a fixed cost20 for the term of the project's power purchase
agreement or longer.202 Title to the equipment allows the tax equity investor to
claim the project's tax credits and other tax benefits while the equipment-
leasing developer continues to operate the project and receives all payments
under the power purchase agreement with the off-taker of the project's
electricity output.203 Upon expiration of the lease, the tax equity investor
usually has the option to retain ownership of the project's equipment or to sell
it back to the developer at its fair market value.204 In theory, the sale-leaseback
structure enables the developer to raise up to one hundred percent of the project
capital through the sale of its equipment. In practice, however, tax equity
investors often use their strong market position to require developers to prepay
a portion of their rent, effectively resulting in a discount that amounts to twenty
percent of the project cost or more.205
The inverted-lease structure, also referred to as a "lease pass-through,"
appears at first glance to be the exact opposite of the sale-leaseback structure
given that here the tax equity investor pays rent to the developer under their
206lease agreement. In exchange for the lease payments, the developer passes
most of the project's tax credits and benefits through to the tax equity
investor.207 To facilitate the pass-through component of the inverted lease the
lessee tax investor also holds an equity stake in the project company.208 From
the project's inception, the inverted-lease structure delivers positive cash flows
to the developer but, unlike the partnership flip and the sale-leaseback, it
requires the developer to invest significant equity capital upfront.209
Whatever the subtle differences between the aforementioned tax equity
structures, they are all "highly complicated and involve significant fees,
restrictions and other costs that divert much of the value of the tax credits away
from reducing the cost of the renewable energy project itself."210 The personnel
time and professional fees required to complete these transactions pose a
particularly high barrier to tax equity investment for smaller renewable energy
inverted-lease structures for any power projects that claim production tax credits. See CHADBOURNE &
PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 30.
201. See also Sharif et al., supra note 194, at 13 (discussing the option of varying lease
payments that fluctuate in correlation with the project's cash flows).
202. MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 15.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Sharif et al., supra note 194, at 13 (discussing the possibility for the
developer and tax equity investor to agree on an early-buyout option for the developer, usually between
years seven and twelve of the project).
205. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 30.
206. See Sharif et al., supra note 194, at 13.
207. Id. at 14.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 16.
210. Comeli, supra note 21, at 13.
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211projects, including the distributed-generation projects that are considered
vital for the construction of a smarter, more resilient, decentralized power
grid.212 According to industry insiders even large-scale renewable wind projects
may see a good share of the developer's profits wiped out by transaction costs
and professional fees "running to $3 to $4 million to close a transaction."213 In
addition, the complex, customized nature of these transactions tailored to suit
the specific needs of each project and tax equity investor causes costly delays
214with some deals taking up to ten months to close. Some analysts estimate
that the transaction costs associated with tax equity investment increase the
financing costs of renewable energy projects by 300 basis points or more,215
adding $7.50 to $15.00 to the generation cost of each MWh of a project's
renewable power output.216
The cost and complexity of tax equity structures suggest that not all of the
tax dollars that fail to make their way into the hands of renewable energy
developers end up in the pockets of Wall Street banks and high-profit
corporations. Rather, a sizeable portion of the federal tax credits' subsidy value
is used to pay legal fees. While this may be good news for the legal profession,
it is terrible news for the renewable energy industry, the federal government,
and its taxpayers.
F. Tax Equity Does Not Play Well With Others
The need for tax equity drives up the cost of renewable energy projects
not only through the premium yield rates that tax investors exact for their
participation and the associated transaction costs but also because tax equity
often forestalls less expensive debt financing.217 Well-developed renewable
energy projects can raise debt capital at interest rates that are up to sixty percent
lower than the yield rates that developers have to pay for tax equity capital.218
Debt, in other words, has a considerably lower cost of capital than (tax)
211. See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 54, at 12 (warning that high transaction
costs "may negate the tax benefits offered by small projects").
212. See, e.g., Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy
Policies to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 Wis. INT'L L.J. 595, 623 (2012)
(making the case for distributed renewable energy generation).
213. CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 32; see also Fisher et al., supra
note 91, at I (lamenting the high transaction costs associated with tax equity financing).
214. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 32.
215. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at I1.
216. See id. (reporting that every 100 basis points of increase to a project's financing
costs adds $2.50-5.00 per MWh to the project's cost of electricity generation).
217. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 4.
218. See id at 2; see also supra Section Il.B (discussing the high yield rates exacted by
tax equity investors); Chris Meehan, MidAmerican Holdings' Topaz Solar Farm Bonds Prove Wildly
Popular, CLEAN ENERGY AUTH. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.cleanenergyauthority.com/solar-energy-ne
ws/midamerican-holdings-topaz-solar-farm-bonds-022412 (describing the recent example of the
oversubscribed Topaz Solar Farm's $850 million bond offering at a yield rate of 5.75%).
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equity.219 In fact, the cost advantages of debt over equity are significant enough
to lead many industries that do not depend on tax credits to forego the tax
code's depreciation benefits in favor of debt-dominated leasing and other
financing structures.220 The same math suggests that the more of its capital
needs a renewable power project can meet in the form of debt, the lower its
levelized cost of electricity will be.221
The bad news for developers is that the need to bring in a tax equity
investor effectively creates a dual obstacle for greater debt-to-equity ratios in
renewable energy projects. First, the aforementioned tax equity structures
required to monetize a project's tax benefits preclude pure debt financing
222structures2. Second, tax equity investors are wary of losing their preferred
access to project cash flows to lenders.223 A forbearance or standstill agreement
between the lender and the tax equity investor may ensure the latter's
entitlement to the project's tax benefits, but the lender's involvement will likely
curtail the tax equity investor's rights to the project's positive cash flows from
power purchase payments.224 As a result, tax investors either refuse to
participate in a debt-financed project or charge an additional premium-on top
225of their already high yield rates -if a renewable power developer wants to
226leverage the project with debt. In practice, tax equity investors add between
300 and 500 basis points to their required yield rates if a developer chooses to
227finance the project with a mix of equity and debt. In addition to further
increasing the cost of tax equity capital, bringing a lender into a renewable
power project's capital structure infuses considerable complexity into the deal,
which further increases transaction costs and may cause costly delays.228
Accordingly, only a handful of renewable energy projects have managed to
combine the tax equity required to monetize federal tax credits with cost-
effective debt financing.229 Against this background, some analysts have
concluded that "[t]he most significant cost of tax equity . . . is that it makes
obtaining project level debt more difficult." 230
219. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at v.
220. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 34.
221. See Harper et al., supra note 83, at v.
222. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 34 (describing how debt
financing would take over if tax credits were replaced with direct cash subsidies).
223. See supra Section 1II.A for a discussion of the debt-equity hybrid character of tax
equity with its preferred access to project cash flows.
224. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 32.
225. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 3.
226. Id.
227. See MINTz LEVIN & GTM RES., supra note 83, at 17.
228. See Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 3.
229. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 32.
230. Fisher et al., supra note 91, at 3.
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G. Summary
Empirical evidence and qualitative analysis illustrate the remarkable
inefficiency of using federal tax credits to promote the deployment of
renewable energy technologies. Unless a project developer has sufficient tax
liability from other sources, she will not be able to reap the full value of her
project's tax benefits. If she chooses to carry these benefits forward until her
project breaks even and generates the necessary taxable income and, hence, tax
liability to use them, she may be able to realize only a third of their subsidy
value.231 Alternatively, the developer may monetize her tax benefits by
bringing in a tax equity investor whose capital contribution effectively buys the
right to use the project's tax benefits to reduce the investor's tax liability from
other sources. But even with the help of a tax equity investor, renewable energy
developers can, at most, realize two-thirds of the value of their project's tax
benefits.232 The required tax equity is scarce and expensive, especially in a slow
economy, limits investment liquidity, drives up transaction costs, and precludes
other, lower-cost financing options.
The tax expenditure literature has long recognized the broader challenges
associated with government use of tax incentives to subsidize socially
beneficial activities, especially by start-up companies and other revenue-
challenged firms.233 Tax credits for renewable energy represent a particularly
dramatic example of these challenges, for a variety of reasons. However one
may feel about the tax system's general suitability for promoting climate
change mitigation, technological innovation, and other non-tax policy goals234
through Pigouvian235 tax expenditures, a government subsidy becomes
231. See Varadarajan et al., supra note 86, at 4; see also supra note 31 (offering a
sample calculation of the net present value of carried-forward tax credits).
232. See Varadarajan et al., supra note 86, at 4; see also supra note 170 and
accompanying text (for industry reports that tax equity investors pay developers as little as fifty percent
of the face value of their tax credits).
233. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 134 (1973)
(discussing the inequities from tax incentives' greater value for high-income than low-income
taxpayers); Warren & Auerbach, supra note 29, at 1758-59 (describing the difficulties that start-up and
loss companies confront in using tax credits and depreciation deductions).
234. Commentators have long debated whether the tax system should be used to
implement public spending programs. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice
at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165,
1175 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV.
187, 206 (2004) (both pointing to the merits of using the tax system to promote non-tax policy
objectives); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort
Our Budget and Our Political Process, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2010); J. Clifton Fleming Jr. &
Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced From a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique
of the "New Paradigm " and its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 172 (2010) (both criticizing the tax
system's use to promote non-tax policy objectives).
235. Named after economist Arthur C. Pigou, Pigouvian tax measures are used to
remedy issues associated with externalities by helping producers internalize the (positive or negative)
cost to society of their activity. For an overview of the economics behind Pigouvian tax measures, see
Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64
STAN. L. REV. 797, 806 (2012).
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untenable based purely on efficiency grounds if only one to two thirds of its
value actually goes to fund the targeted activity. Moreover, the ability of a
small group of high-income entities to divert significant portions of the subsidy
into their own pockets raises serious concerns over taxpayer equity. Lastly, the
tax credit regime's inefficiencies translate to suboptimal deployment rates that,
in turn, impede the timely decarbonization of America's energy economy, as
required for effective climate change mitigation.
IV. The Political Economy of Renewable Energy Policy
Fiscal sustainability, taxpayer equity, concerns over climate change, and
the quest to secure American leadership in the global clean energy race all
suggest that the current regime of federal tax credits make way for a less
wasteful, more cost-effective policy to promote renewable energy. Three types
of policy proposals-calling for some version of a federal cap-and-trade
scheme, RPS, or feed-in tariff-have dominated the debate on Capitol Hill in
recent years.
Economists have long suggested that a price on greenhouse gas emissions,
in the form of a carbon tax236 or cap-and-trade regime,237 is, in theory, the
single most efficient policy to mitigate climate change and promote abatement
technologies, such as solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewable energy
technologies.238 A price on greenhouse gas emissions would require producers
to internalize the cost of their emissions and thereby penalize pollution and
encourage abatement. Over time, this direct, static effect would be
complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect of encouraging refinement of
existing and development of new abatement technologies.239 From an
efficiency perspective, a tax on greenhouse gas emissions or a cap-and-trade
scheme would incur lower opportunity costs than direct subsidies for these
technologies.240
Advocates of a federal RPS tout the policy's track record at the U.S. state
level, with twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia using RPS programs
to promote renewable power.241 A nationwide RPS could harmonize previously
Balkanized state markets for REC trading to increase market liquidity and
reduce price volatility. Similar to a cap-and-trade scheme, a federal RPS is
236. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf& David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009).
237. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and
Complimentary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 212 (2012).
238. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 16, at 35, 348; Finon, supra note 16, at 112; Jaffe et
al., supra note 16, at 165, 169; Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 140.
239. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 16, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental
policy on technological change).
240. See Mormann, supra note 17, at 929.
241. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdatalindex.cfm (last visited May 15, 2014).
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expected to harness the market's competitive forces to promote deployment of
the most cost-effective technologies in locations with the best resource
quality.24
Proponents of a federal feed-in tariff highlight the policy's international
deployment record243 as well as its recent uptake at the U.S. state244 and
municipal 245 levels. At comparable remuneration levels, feed-in tariffs have
been shown to enjoy greater support in the investment community,246 and are
expected to leverage more private capital than RPS due to minimizing the
market risk exposure of investors.247 Accordingly, feed-in tariffs are claimed to
promote the deployment of renewable energy more cost-effectively.248
Notwithstanding the relative strengths of each of these policies, none has
managed to gain much traction on Capitol Hill. Over thirty failed proposals for
a federal cap-and-trade regime, RPS, or feed-in tariff raise serious doubt as to
their political viability.249 Federal tax incentives for renewable energy,
242. For an overview of the arguments for a federal RPS, see, for example, Christopher
Cooper, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, 21 ELEC.
J. 9 (2008); Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1340 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy
Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources,
Changing Market: The Impact ofa National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry,
29 ENERGY L.J. 49 (2008); Robert J. Lunt, Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 UCLA J. EVTL. L. & POL'Y 371 (2007); Robert J. Michaels, National
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2008);
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong: The Case for a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85
(2008); and Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy:
Tripping the Horse with the Cart, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 5 (2007).
243. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY2011, supra note 107, at 130.
244. See Feed-in Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/providerprograms.cfm (last visited May 15, 2014).
245. Municipalities with feed-in tariffs include Gainesville (FL), Los Angeles (CA),
and Palo Alto (CA). See About CLEAN Programs, CLEAN COAL., http://www.clean-coalition.org/unleas
hing-clean/about-clean-programs (last visited May 15, 2014).
246. Mary Jean Boirer & Rolf Wilstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy is a
Venture Capitalist's Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International Cleantech
Investors, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 4997 (2009).
247. See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42
ENvTL. L. 681, 701 (2012).
248. For a discussion of the arguments in favor of a federal feed-in tariff, see, for
example, David Bloom et al., State Feed-in Tariffs: Recent FERC Guidance for How to Make Them FIT
Under Federal Law, 24 ELEC. J. 26 (2011); Pierre Bull et al., Designing Feed-in Tariff Policies to Scale
Clean Distributed Generation in the U.S., 24 ELEC. J. 52 (2011); Lincoln L. Davies, Incentivizing
Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-in Tariffs, I KLRI J. OF L.
AND LEG. 39 (2011); Michael Dorsi, Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and
Options for Feed-in Tariffs, 35 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 173 (2011-2012); Judith Lipp, Lessons
for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, 35
ENERGY POL'Y 5481 (2007); Teresa E. Morton & Jeffrey M. Peabody, Feed-in Tariffs: Misfits in the
Federal and State Regulatory Regime?, 23 ELEC. J. 17 (2010); and Rickerson et al., supra note 40.
249. For evidence of the failed campaigns for a federal cap-and-trade regime, see
S. 1733, 11Ith Cong. (2009); and H.R. 2454, 11Ith Cong. (2009). For reports of the failed campaigns
for a federal RPS, see Davies, supra note 233, at 1341; and Shelley Welton, From the States Up:
Building a National Renewable Energy Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 996 (2009). For evidence of
337
Yale Journal on Regulation
meanwhile, have managed to garner sufficient political support for periodic
extensions and renewals across various Congresses and administrations. 250
Considering the many inefficiencies of tax credits and other tax breaks for
renewables, this political success speaks less to their relative efficacy and
efficiency compared to competing policies than to the political economy of
renewable energy policy. The greater political appeal of "carrots" in the form
of tax breaks compared to the "stick" of pricing greenhouse gas emissions
confirms common intuition.251 But why do tax breaks fare so much better on
Capitol Hill than other, more cost-effective carrots, such as direct cash
subsidies, an RPS, or a feed-in tariff? The answer to this question lies, at least
in part, in the preferential treatment of tax expenditures in terms of both
budgetary consideration and Congressional process of enactment.
Nearly half a century ago, Stanley Surrey criticized that tax expenditures
were not listed among the line items on the expenditure side of the federal
budget, and hence, did not automatically come under the close scrutiny of the
252Congress and the Budget Bureau. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has
since introduced the mandatory compilation of tax expenditures into the budget
process, but tax expenditures still avoid the annual review required for other
253spending measures. This budgetary treatment has been suggested to lower
the political saliency of tax expenditures, often allowing them to fly under the
radar of public opinion and, therefore, requiring less political capital to enact
254than other, more direct spending measures. Moreover, discretionary spending
is frequently subject to strict limits, while tax expenditures have rarely been
subject to similar controls.255 Finally, tax credits, depreciation deductions, and
other tax expenditures are likely to be more philosophically appealing to those
politicians and voters calling for reductions in taxpayers' overall tax burden.
From a procedural perspective, enactment of a discretionary spending
program is significantly more complex and lengthier than congressional
256approval of tax expenditures2. Discretionary spending measures generally
must survive a two-step process to be enacted, starting with the passage of
authorizing legislation following consideration by each chamber's responsible
the failed campaigns for a federal feed-in tariff, see Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R.
6401, 110th Cong. (2008).
250. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
251. See Galle, supra note 235, at 841 (discussing the "social overproduction of
carrots").
252. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 233, at 4.
253. See Wallace, supra note 183, at 155.
254. See Galle, supra note 235, at 844; Kleinbard, supra note 234, at 18.
255. See Wallace, supra note 183, at 272.
256. See, e.g., Batchelder et al., supra note 31, at 39 (discussing policymakers' growing
reliance on the tax code rather than direct government expenditures as the result of incentives within the
tax legislative process); Wallace, supra note 183, at 271 (discussing the relative ease of enactment of tax
expenditures compared to direct spending measures). For a summary of the legislative process for
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subject-specific, legislative committee. Once authorized, the spending program
requires appropriation of funds through separate legislation following
consideration by each chamber's appropriations committee. Tax expenditures,
in contrast, require only a single act of legislation and consideration by two
rather than four different committees-the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee.
The systemic preference for tax expenditures over more direct spending
measures suggests that the best way to promote both fiscal sustainability and
renewable energy, at least in the near term, may be to fix rather than replace the
current regime of federal tax credits for renewables. A number of scholars have
argued for the tradability or refundability of tax credits in general. 257 In the
context of renewable energy, either approach would go a long way in allowing
developers to monetize their tax credits without incurring the efficiency losses
associated with the need to bring in a tax equity investor. Notwithstanding the
persuasiveness of arguments in favor of tradable tax credits, the tax code's
general prohibition of trafficking in tax attributes still stands strong, with only a
tiny fraction of all tax credits authorized for trading.258 Similarly, the tax code
reserves the refundability of tax credits for rare exceptions,259 despite the strong
economic and distributional arguments in favor of refundable tax credits. 260
The steadfast opposition to refundable tax credits is based on concerns that
refundability would turn the tax system into a welfare system and lead to
widespread fraud and abuse. 261
The political economy of renewable energy policy explains why federal
incentives for emerging energy technologies traditionally fall within the
domain of tax policy.262 The systemic bias in favor of tax expenditures, along
with the dozens of failed non-tax policy proposals for renewable energy,
suggests that federal policy reform will most likely have to come from within
the tax system. The bad news is that tax credits themselves have proven largely
immune to reform. The good news is that tax policy support for renewable
energy does not have to take the form of tax credits.
257. See, e.g., Batchelder et al., supra note 31 (refundability); Wallace, supra note 183
(tradability).
258. See Wallace, supra note 183, at 237 (citing the examples of the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit and the New Markets Tax Credit).
259. See Batchelder et al., supra note 31, at 33 (referencing the Earned Income Tax
Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and a small health insurance credit as the three principal refundable tax
credits).
260. Id. at 43.
261. For a summary of the primary arguments against refundability of tax credits, see
id. at 65-72. Due to the functional parallels between refundability and tradability, these arguments can
also be applied against tradable tax credits. See WALLACE, supra note 183, at 247 (describing the
economic equivalence between tradable and refundable tax credits and arguing that "[t]he efficiency of
tradable tax credits matches, and in some instances may surpass, that of refundable tax credits").
262. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 67, at 185-90. For a discussion of the history
and importance of tax incentives for the economy broadly, see HUNGERFORD & GRAVELLE, supra note
57.
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V. Smarter Tax Policy: MLPs and REITs for Renewables
Thinking outside the tax-credit box, policymakers could look to other
sectors of the economy for guidance on how to best use tax policy to promote
investment and economic growth in renewables. Doing so, they would likely
come across MLPs and REITs, two tax-privileged structures with a proven
track record of promoting investment in oil, gas, and other conventional energy
infrastructure. MLPs and REITs foster investment in eligible assets and
activities by granting the same access to capital markets as classic corporations
while offering investors the same benefits of single-layer taxation as closely
held partnerships.263 To date, renewable energy developers must choose
between capital market access through incorporation or single-layer taxation as
a partnership-but lacking access to the MLP and REIT structures they cannot
have both.264 The history of MLPs and REITs reflects a trend toward gradual
expansion of the scope of qualifying investments beyond exhaustible natural
resources and classic real estate interests.265 Access to the MLP and REIT
structures would allow renewable energy developers and investors to combine
the fundraising advantages of a corporation with the tax benefits of partnership.
Merging the best of both worlds, MLPs and REITs could significantly reduce
the cost of capital for renewable power projects, foster popular support, and
create stronger, more transparent markets for renewables.266 Federal
policymakers have a choice between various options how to best open MLPs
and REITs up to renewable energy investment.267 From a budgetary
perspective, MLPs and REITs for renewables would impose significantly lower
costs (if any) on taxpayers than the existing regime of federal tax credits. 268
Before renewable energy MLPs and REITs can become a reality, however, a
269number of closely related policy challenges will need to be resolved.
263. See infra Section V.A.
264. In order to monetize their tax benefits by bringing in a tax equity investor, most
developers use some form of partnership structure. See supra Section III.E. The renewables industry has
recently begun to experiment with so-called "yieldcos" that use classic corporate structures to raise low-
cost equity capital on public markets. NRG Yield, the first yieldco to go public in July 2013, purports to
achieve similar tax efficiencies to MLPs and REITs by putting together a carefully balanced portfolio of
income-generating assets and tax benefit-generating assets in order to minimize overall tax liabilities at
the entity level. Very few market participants, however, possess the necessary expertise or have
sufficiently diversified asset portfolios to replicate this approach, casting serious doubt on the capacity
of yieldcos to reduce the cost of capital for renewable energy at the same scale as MLPs or REITs. See
Joseph Salvatore & Stefan Linder, Yieldcos, FAITs, and More: Sizing the Market for North American
Exit Vehicles, BLOOMBERG NEw ENERGY FIN. 4 (2013) ("[NRG's] approach is difficult to replicate-
many renewable owners do not own these types of assets and thus cannot enjoy this access to the
offsetting revenue streams of fossil generation.").
265. See infra Section V.B.
266. See infra Section V.C.
267. See infra Section V.D.
268. See infra Section V.E.
269. See infra Section V.F.
340
Vol. 31, 2014
Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future
A. How MLPs and REITs Work
As their name implies, MLPs are limited partnerships, typically formed
under the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, with one or
more general partners and thousands of limited partners. 270 The general
partners usually hold an ownership stake of approximately two percent and are
271
tasked with the partnership's management. General partners may or may not
have incentive distribution rights granting them a preferred share of the MLP's
cash distributions that increases with each marginal increase in the
partnership's overall cash distributions.272 The MLP's limited partners, referred
to as unitholders, provide capital in exchange for the prospect of quarterly cash
distributions similar to a dividend but they have no part in the partnership's
operations or management. 273 MLPs typically pay out all available cash to
unitholders except for those cash flows that management considers required for
"the proper conduct of the business." 274
Like classic corporations, MLPs can be traded on public exchanges to
increase investment liquidity and appeal to a broader range of investors.275
MLPs typically do not own and operate their assets directly but do so indirectly
through a subsidiary operating company.276 Unlike classic corporations, MLPs
are not taxed at both the entity and shareholder levels but, instead, pass all tax
items through to their unitholders who then pay tax only at their individual
rates.277 As pass-through entities, MLPs can raise capital at lower cost,
allowing them to build and operate low-retum assets, such as rate-regulated
pipelines while still offering rates of return that are high enough to attract
270. See Patrick W. Mattingly, Master Limited Partnerships, 28 ENERGY & MIN. L.
INST. 118, 119, 125 (2008); Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS 38, http://www.naptp.org/documentlinks/InvestorRelations/MLP_1
0.pdf (last updated Oct. 4, 2013). Under state law, MLPs can also be organized as limited liability
companies (LLCs) and other unincorporated entities while still maintaining the MLP treatment for
federal tax purposes. See Mattingly, supra, at 119.
271. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41893, MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: A POLICY OPTION FOR THE RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRY
2 (2011); Michael Blum et al., MLP Primer Fifth Edition, WELLS FARGO SEC., LLC: EQUITY RES.
DEP'T 18 (2013), http://www.naptp.org/documentlinks/InvestorRelations/WFMLPPrimer V.pdf.
272. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 2; Blum et al., supra note 271,
at 24; Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N PUBLICLY TRADED
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 41, 42.
273. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 2; Blum et al., supra note 271,
at 18; Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L Ass'N PUBLICLY TRADED
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 38.
274. See Blum et al., supra note 271, at 25.
275. See MATrINGLY, supra note 270, at 123; Master Limited Partnerships 101:
Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 48.
276. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 3.
277. See Blum et al., supra note 271, at 18; Master Limited Partnerships 101:
Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 45.
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investors on capital markets.278 These tax privileges, however, come at the
price of added complexities to tax reporting for MLP investors and the
deterrence of certain investors from MLP investment. 279
To qualify for the tax code's privileged treatment as a pass-through entity
whilst maintaining the liquidity profile of a classic corporation, MLPs must
derive at least ninety percent of their income from qualified sources.280 These
sources include dividends, rents, gains from the disposition of real estate and
capital assets, certain income and gains from commodities trading, and income
and gains from qualifying activities related to minerals and natural resources as
281well as industrial source carbon dioxide. Qualifying activities range from the
exploration, development, and mining to the production, processing, and
transporting, to the marketing of minerals, natural resources, and industrial
carbon dioxide.282 But not all minerals and natural resources qualify: the tax
code limits MLP eligibility to income from exhaustible minerals and natural
resources, i.e., "any product of a character with respect to which a deduction
283for depletion is allowable under Section 611" of the Code. The only statutory
exception in favor of potentially inexhaustible resources allows MLPs to derive
qualifying income from the transportation and storage of select renewable and
alternative fuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel.284
The tax code sets forth a number of organizational requirements for a
corporation, trust, or association that would otherwise be taxable as a domestic
285corporation to claim the tax-privileged status of a REIT. For instance, REITs
must be managed by trustees or directors and are required to issue transferable
shares or certificates.286 These shares or certificates cannot be closely held but,
rather, must be owned by no fewer than 100 shareholders. 287
REITs resemble MLPs in their avoidance of double-layer taxation but
achieve their status as entities with single-layer taxation in a different manner.
288Unlike MLPs, REITs are not tax-exempt at the entity level2. Instead, a REIT
can reduce its taxable income by a deduction in the amount of the qualifying
278. See Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 47.
279. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 4; Mattingly, supra note 270,
at 128; see also infra Subsection V.F.3.
280. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(c) (2012); see SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 6.
281. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1); see also Blum et al., supra note 271, at 18; Eric M.
Conklin, Master Limited Partnerships Primer-A Guide to Understanding the MLP, CREDIT SUISSE
FIRST Bos. EQUITY RES. 11 (2005).
282. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E); see also Mattingly, supra note 270, at 120.
283. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1).
284. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E).
285. 26 U.S.C.§ 856(a); see also Joshua L. Sturtevant, The S-REIT: An Investment-
Driven Solution to Solar Development Problems, GEO. WASH. SOLAR INST. 12 (2011), http://www.oure
nergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Sturtevant S-REIT.pdf.
286. 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)-(2).
287. 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(5)-(6).
288. See Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1410.
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dividends that are paid out to its shareholders. These dividends are then taxed
only at the shareholder level as part of their gross income.289 To qualify for the
dividend deduction from taxable income, a REIT must distribute at least ninety
percent of its annual taxable income to its shareholders.290 Like MLPs, most
REITs are publicly traded, although private REITs whose shares are not traded
on public exchanges have recently gained in popularity, especially among tax-
exempt institutional and foreign investors.291
To qualify for tax-privileged treatment as pass-through entities, the tax
code requires REITs to fulfill the requirements of a series of asset and income
tests.292 The most important of a total of six asset tests requires that seventy-
five percent of the REIT's assets be composed of real estate interests including
mortgages and shares in other REITs, cash and cash items, as well as
government securities.293 Two income tests carry forth the emphasis on real
estate. The first test requires ninety-five percent or more of the REIT's gross
annual income to come from real estate rents, gains from the disposition of real
estate and related mortgages, or investment income, including dividends,
294interests, and gains from stocks and securities sales. The second test further
emphasizes the focus on real estate by mandating that at least seventy-five
percent of the REIT's gross annual income be derived from sources specifically
related to real property. 295
B. A Brief History of MLPs and REITs
Apache Petroleum formed the first MLP in 1981,296 the same year that the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 gave the partnership structure a boost by
reducing the top individual marginal tax rate from seventy percent to fifty
percent.297 Five years later, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 further increased the
tax attractiveness of partnership business structures by reducing the top
marginal income tax rate for individuals to a level below the top marginal tax
289. See id.
290. 26 U.S.C. § 857(a)(1)(A); see also Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1410 (explaining
that the minimum distribution requirement does not apply to capital gains income); David F. Levy et al.,
Wind REITS: The New Tax Equity, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, May 2012, at 36, 39,
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/05/wind-reits; Sturtevant, supra note 285, at 13.
291. See Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1410.
292. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)-(d) (asset and income tests); 26 U.S.C. § 857 (taxation of
REITs).
293. 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(A).
294. 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2).
295. 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3).
296. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 75TH CONG., TAXATION OF
MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 4 (1987); SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 5.
297. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; see also Jane R. Livingstone & Thomas R. Omer,
Publicly Traded Partnerships, Tax Cost, and Choice of Entity, 124 TAX NOTES 365, 367 (2009)
(describing the historic reasons for the MLP structure's growing popularity in the 1980s).
343
Yale Journal on Regulation
rate for corporations.298 The MLP structure was quickly adopted across a wide
range of industries, from hotels and restaurants to investment advisors to
299amusement parks; even the Boston Celtics became an MLP. Fearing that
widespread use of the tax-privileged MLP structure in lieu of the classic
corporation would erode the corporate tax base, Congress used the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 to restrict the tax-privileged use of MLPs
and other publicly traded partnerships. 3oo As a general rule, any partnership
whose ownership interests were publicly traded was, for tax purposes, to be
treated as a corporation requiring it to pay taxes at both the entity and
shareholder levels.301 The Revenue Act of 1987, however, also established an
exemption from corporate taxation for MLPs that derive at least ninety percent
of their income from qualified sources, such as interests, dividends, rents,
royalties as well as income and gains derived from minerals and natural
resources.302 One year later, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988 clarified that only "exhaustible" natural resources were intended to be
sources of qualified income for tax-privileged MLPs.303 The accompanying
Senate Report further clarified that "qualifying income does not include, for
example, income from . . . hydroelectric, solar, wind, or nuclear power
production. "3  Following this initial wave of regulation, the tax code's
provisions regarding qualifying income for MLPs remained unchanged for over
twenty years.305 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 added
certain renewable and alternative fuels as well as industrial carbon dioxide to
the catalog of eligible sources of income for tax-privileged MLPs.306 Today
some 120 MLPs are listed on major stock exchanges with a few more trading
over the counter.307 Seventy-five percent of MLPs are engaged in oil, gas, coal,
and other energy-related activities.30s
298. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
299. See Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L Ass'N
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 14; John W. Slater, Jr., Publicly Traded Limited
Partnership: An Emerging Financial Alternative to the Public Corporation, 39 BuS. LAW. 709, 710
(1984).
300. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330; see also H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1065
("To the extent activities that would otherwise be conducted in the corporate form, and earnings that
would be subject to two levels of tax (at the corporate and shareholder levels), the growth of publicly
traded partnerships engaged in such activities tends to jeopardize the corporate tax base.").
301. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(a) (2012); SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 6.
302. 26 U.S.C. § 7704(c); SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 6. For more
detail regarding MLP-qualifying income, see supra Section V.A.
303. Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(f)(4), 102 Stat. 3342; see also H.R. REP. No. 100-
1104, at 17 ("The conference agreement follows the Senate amendment; except that ... minerals from
sea, water, the air, or similar inexhaustible sources, shall not be treated as a mineral or natural
resource.").
304. S. REP. No. 100-445, 424; see also H.R REP. No. 100-795, at 400.
305. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 7.
306. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
307. See Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L Ass'N
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 25.
308. See id at 31.
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The historic roots of REITs can be traced back to the late 1800s when so-
called Massachusetts Trusts were used to pool property investments.30
Following a series of judicial decisions with wide-ranging effects on REITs and
their taxation,310 today's REIT regime was established in 1960 when President
Eisenhower signed the REIT Act into law. 31 The Act allowed for the formation
of REITs that enjoy essentially the same single-layer taxation privileges as
partnerships and other pass-through entities so long as the trust meets the
requirements of a series of asset and income tests.312 The REIT Act's declared
purpose was to enable not only large institutional but also smaller individual
investors to invest in large diversified portfolios of income-producing
properties. The first REITs to form, however, were so-called debt or
mortgage REITs that originated construction loans. 3 14 It was not until after the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed REITs to both own and manage their
properties that the REIT Act's original promise began to be fulfilled as so-
called equity REITs holding actual real estate assets took over.315 In 1991 the
first REIT went public, marking what has been described as "the dawn of the
modem REIT era." 316
Over the past twenty years, a series of legislative and administrative acts
have further bolstered the market appeal of REITs. The REIT Simplification
Act of 1997 allowed REITs to provide a small amount of non-customary
services to its tenants without disqualifying associated rental income from
REIT eligibility. 3 The REIT Modernization Act of 1999 enabled REITs to
form taxable subsidiaries that may deliver atypical services to REIT tenants and
others. 318 The IRS, meanwhile, has issued a number of broadly applicable
revenue rulings and fact-specific private letter rulings to clarify and broaden the
309. See Jonathan S. Kilpatrick, REIT 101, GREENFIELD ADVISORS (2012),
http://www.greenfieldadvisors.com/docs/kilpatrickjonathan/REIT 101_greenfield advisors.pdf; Sturtevant,
supra note 285, at 8.
310. See, e.g., Morissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Crocker v. Malley, 249
U.S. 223 (1918); Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178 (1910); Commissioner v. North Am. Bond Trust, 112
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1941).
311. The REIT Act was part of the Cigar Excise Tax Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 86-
779, 74 Stat. 998 (1960).
312. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)-(d) (2012) (asset and income tests); 26 U.S.C. § 857
(taxation of REITs).
313. See STEFANO SIMONTACCHI & UWE STOSCHEK, GUIDE TO GLOBAL REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS 8 (2012); Sturtevant, supra note 285, at 10.
314. See Kilpatrick, supra note 309, at 2.
315. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; see SIMONTACCHI & STOSCHEK, supra note
313, at 9; Kilpatrick, supra note 309, at 2.
316. SIMONTACCHI & STOSCHEK, supra note 313, at 9.
317. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. The REIT Simplification Act was part of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
318. Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860. The REIT Modernization Act was contained
in the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. For an example of REIT use of
the taxable subsidiary option, see Levy et al., supra note 290, at 42.
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definition of REIT-eligible assets and income. Today there are
approximately 190 publicly listed REITs, most of which trade on the New York
Stock Exchange. 320
C. What MLPs and REITs Can Do for Renewables
MLPs and REITs combine the tax privileges of traditional partnership
structures with the fundraising advantages of classic corporations. Merging the
best of both worlds, MLPs and REITs for renewables would enable project
developers to tap into pools of capital that are wider, deeper, and cheaper than
under currently available financing structures.321 The broad investor appeal of
both structures would help promote popular support for renewable energy
development.322 The investment liquidity of publicly traded MLPs and REITs
could help create new markets and improve overall market transparency. 323
Standardization could help reduce deal complexity and associated transaction
costs.324
1. Access to Capital Markets Lowers the Cost of Financing
MLPs and REITs have proven highly effective at raising capital on the
New York Stock Exchange and other public capital markets. Despite the tax
325code's restrictions on eligible investment assets and activities, MLPs boast a
current market capitalization exceeding $490 billion with REITs weighing in at
over $670 billion.326 Remarkably, MLPs and REITs have been able to raise
these impressive amounts of capital while offering relatively modest annual
dividend yields of 6.50/o and 4.2% respectively. 327 Comparing these numbers to
328the yield rates of fifteen percent or more that tax equity investors charge, it
319. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-424, 1975-2 C.B. 269 (microwave transmitting and
receiving towers); Rev. Rul. 69-94, 1969-1 C.B. 189 (railroad trackage, roadbed, bridges, and tunnels);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 125828-11 (Oct. 24, 2011) (LED billboards); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 130186-10 (Apr.
6, 2011) (cell towers); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 114933-07 (Dec. 28, 2007) (data centers); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 147229-06 (Mar. 13, 2007) (electricity transmission and distribution systems).
320. See REITWatch June 2013, NAT'L Ass'N REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TR. (2013),
http://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/reitwatch/RW1306.pdf.
321. See infra Subsection V.C.I.
322. See infra Subsection V.C.2.
323. See infra Subsection V.C.3.
324. See infra Subsection V.C.4.
325. See supra Section V.A.
326. See Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs, NAT'L ASS'N
PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 33; NAT'L ASS'N REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TR.,
supra note 320, at 1.
327. See Blum et al., supra note 271, at 11; Theodore Durbin et al., MLP-IFICATION:
Focus oN ENERGY, GOLDMAN SACHS EQUITY RES. (2013); NAT'L Ass'N REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
TR., supra note 320, at 1.
328. See supra Section IlI.B.
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becomes apparent by just how much renewable energy projects could reduce
their cost of equity capital given access to MLP and REIT financing.
Moreover, unlike current tax equity structures,329 both MLPs and REITs
lend themselves to a well-balanced financing mix of equity and debt capital.330
Without a tax equity investor to object to the dilution of her preferred access to
cash flows, renewable energy projects can compete for debt capital on their
merits. Manufacturer-backed, lifetime warranties reduce technology risk while
long-term power purchase agreements with electric utilities minimize market
off-take risks, making well-developed projects attractive for debt investors.331
The capacity to combine low-cost equity capital from public .markets with
readily available debt at low interest rates puts MLPs and REITs in a prime
position to drive down the overall cost of capital for renewable power projects.
At a time when financing charges can drive up a renewable energy
project's overall cost of electricity by up to fifty percent,332 MLPs and REITs
could go a long way in cutting the cost of renewable power.
2. Broad Investor Appeal Promotes Popular Support
The capital market success of MLPs and REITs is a testament to both
structures' ability to appeal to a broad spectrum of investors, ranging from
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other large-scale institutional
investors to small-scale retail investors who trade stocks for their personal
accounts.333 MLPs and REITs can be structured to pool otherwise illiquid
financial assets, such as solar lease contracts or wind power purchase
agreements, into tradable investment products. 334 Such securitization would not
only help attract investors who are deterred by the illiquidity of renewable
energy investment under the current regime of tax credits. 335 Use of MLPs and
329. See supra Section III.F.
330. See Blum et aL, supra note 271, at 105; NAT'L Ass'N REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT
TR., supra note 320, at 2.
331. For an introduction to the risk-and-return reasoning of debt and other investors
regarding renewable energy projects, see David Feldman & Edward Settle, Master Limited Partnerships
and Real Estate Investment Trusts, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 22-23 (2013),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60413.pdf; Uday Varadarajan et al., The Impacts of Policy on the
Financing of Renewable Projects: A Case Study Analysis, CLIMATE POL'Y INITIATIVE 3-6 (2011),
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Policy-Impacts-on-Financing-of-Renewab
les.pdf.
332. See Michael Mendelsohn et al., The Impact of Financial Structure on the Cost of
Solar Energy, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 21 (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl2osti
/53086.pdf; Varadarajan et al., supra note 331, at 24.
333. See W. Bruce Bullock et al., Leveling the Playing Field: The Case for Master
Limited Partnerships for Renewables 8 (2012), http://www.pressdocs.cox.smu.edu/maguire/AWEA%20
final%20report%205-12.pdf; Mormann & Reicher, supra note 158. For a more granular discussion of
MLPs' and REITs' respective appeal to various investor types, see infra Subsection V.F.3.
334. See Mendelsohn & Feldman, supra note 34, at 5.
335. Id. at 6.
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REITs as securitization vehicles could also expand access to lower-cost public
capital to smaller projects and developers with less financial backing.336
The need for either taxable income or tax equity, along with the
exclusivity of today's elite circle of tax equity investors, has earned renewable
energy tax credits the label of a "rich man's feed-in tariff."337 In contrast, MLPs
and REITs for renewables could usher in a veritable democratization of
America's energy future. Just as REITs were originally introduced to
encourage small-scale individual investment in large-scale commercial real
estate development, so could MLPs and REITs empower individual investors to
participate in a renewable energy project and its profits. 338 Publicly traded
shares in renewable energy MLPs and REITs would allow millions of
Americans to invest in the nation's energy future.
Besides lowering the industry's cost of capital, the democratization effect
of crowdfunding for renewables through MLPs and REITs offers another, less
salient but similarly important, benefit to renewable energy developers. Recent
scholarship has identified local acceptance and other behavioral factors as key
determinants of a renewable energy policy's deployment success. 339 When
renewable power projects struggle to overcome local not-in-my-backyard
reservations, they often suffer from longer lead times and expensive litigation
that drive up overall project costs, as evidenced by the fierce opposition to wind
power projects in Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the Nantucket Sound.340
Conversely, renewable power projects that enjoy local support proceed more
swiftly and more cost-effectively, as illustrated by the deployment success of
participatory structures such as wind cooperatives, citizen wind farms, and
community solar projects.341 Simply speaking, greater involvement in
renewable energy projects fosters higher levels of local acceptance.342 With
their own stake in America's clean energy future, MLP and REIT investors will
likely become more supportive of local renewable energy development, instead
of feeling like the victims of an aesthetic assault on their backyards by
anonymous, corporate developers exploiting a rich man's policy.343 Thanks to
its favorable impact on zoning, permitting, and other local gate-keeping
336. Id.
337. David Toke, Are Green Electricity Certificates the Way Forward for Renewable
Energy? An Evaluation of the United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation in the Context of International
Comparisons, 23 ENV'T & PLANNING C: Gov'T & POL'Y 361, 368 (2005).
338. See supra Section V.B.
339. See Mormann, supra note 17, at 927.
340. For details on local zoning efforts against wind development in Wyoming, the
protracted conflict over wind power projects off Cape Cod, and debates over the aesthetics of ridgeline
wind projects in Vermont, see Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change
Policy Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System
Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 775 (2010); see also Michaels, supra note 242, at 98 (discussing
growing localized hostility to wind project development).
341. See Mormann, supra note 17, at 963.
342. Id.
343. See Mormann, supra note 247, at 723; Toke, supra note 337, at 368.
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functions, widespread MLP and REIT investment in renewables has the
potential to reduce project lead times and thereby translate to real savings for
renewable power developers and, ultimately, electricity ratepayers.
3. Investment Liquidity Creates Markets and Transparency
With publicly traded shares, MLPs and REITs could dramatically improve
the liquidity of renewable energy investment. Under the current regime, the tax
code's recapture rules penalize the sale and resale of tax equity stakes in
renewable power projects.34 In contrast, renewable energy MLPs and REITs
trading on major exchanges would allow investors to time their investment
decisions according to their own needs as well as market developments. By
promoting greater investment liquidity, MLPs and REITs for renewables could
provide three distinct benefits to investors and developers over the useful life of
a project. First, the option value of being able to sell shares whenever necessary
or convenient would greatly increase the ability of renewable power developers
to cost-effectively raise much needed up-front equity capital to finance their
projects.345
Second, MLPs and REITs would help create a sound secondary market for
existing renewable energy projects to (re)finance themselves. This would be
especially important in light of the marketplace's current reliance on scarce tax
equity. Once a project's eligibility for tax credits and the associated recapture
period have lapsed, the project no longer needs to maintain costly tax equity
capital. Meanwhile, new projects are constantly searching for tax investors in
order to monetize federal tax credits. In the interest of overall market efficiency
and growth, therefore, tax equity that is no longer needed for existing projects
should be reinvested as quickly as possible in order to finance new renewable
power development.346 Similarly, the developer should be free to pull out and
reinvest her own equity capital to develop the next project as soon as possible.
In both cases, however, reinvestment first requires a viable exit option. MLPs
and REITs can provide that exit option by allowing renewable energy projects
to replace developer equity and tax equity with shareholder capital raised on
public markets. Remarkably, demand for such exit vehicles will be strong in the
foreseeable future even if Congress decides not to renew the production tax
credit for wind and the solar investment tax credit is, indeed, phased down at
the end of 2016. Whatever the future holds for tax credit support for
renewables, thousands of megawatts of recently deployed solar and wind power
capacity347 will exhaust their eligibility for tax credits in the next five to ten
344. See supra Section IID.
345. See Meister, supra note 192, at 18 (highlighting the premium investors place on
investment liquidity).
346. See Alex Kovacheva & Michel Di Capua, Master Limited Partnerships for US.
Renewables: Panacea or Pie in the Sky?, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 8 (2012).
347. See supra Section H.A.
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years.348 No longer dependent on tax-equity-driven deal structures,349 these
assets will look to refinance themselves through tax-efficient investment
structures with access to low-cost capital. Combining the tax benefits of a
partnership with the fundraising perks of a classic corporation, MLPs and
REITs represent ideal exit vehicles for mature and no longer tax-credit-eligible
renewable power assets.
The third benefit from greater investment liquidity for renewables through
publicly traded MLPs and REITs hinges on the role of capital markets as
conveyors of information. As demand and supply determine the trading prices
of shares, they also provide important information to investors. The trading
prices for renewable energy MLP and REIT shares may help investors better
assess a project's technological reliability, resource quality, off-take risk, and
other critical characteristics. Furthermore, publicly traded MLPs and REITs are
subject to the usual capital market reporting requirements, which would further
improve the transparency of renewable energy development and investment.350
Together, the transparency of capital markets and the resulting competitive
pressures can be expected to further strengthen the professionalism and quality
of renewable power project development.35 1
4. Standardization Reduces Deal Complexity and Cost
Finally, MLPs and REITs for renewables would significantly reduce the
complexity of project financing structures and, with it, associated lead times
and transaction costs.352 Tax equity deals require one-off structures that are
custom-tailored to meet the specific needs of the individual tax investor. In the
few instances that a developer can convince the tax investor to bring in a lender
to help finance the project with debt capital, the deal structure is further
complicated by the need to negotiate and execute forbearance and standstill
agreements between the lender and tax equity investor.353 In contrast, MLPs
and REITs allow for relatively standardized deal structures that can assemble a
portfolio of projects under the same ownership entity and thereby help reduce
complexity and transaction costs.354 The larger volume and similarity of pooled
348. See supra Subsections I.B. I and I.B.2 (discussing the five- and ten-year tax credit
eligibility periods for solar, wind, and other renewable energy technologies).
349. See supra Section III.E.
350. See, e.g., SIMONTACCHI & STOSCHEK, supra note 313, at 20; Mattingly, supra
note 270, at 126.
351. Market analysts, fund managers, institutional investors, and other participants and
observers of capital markets can be expected to assume if not refine the gate-keeping function currently
fulfilled by tax equity investors. See CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP, supra note 51, at 37 (discussing the
impact that competition among developers for scarce tax equity has had on the quality of projects).
352. For a detailed discussion of the cost and complexity of tax equity financing
structures for renewable energy, see supra Section III.E.
353. See supra Section Ill.F.
354. See, e.g., SIMONTACCHI & STOSCHEK, supra note 313, at 14; Mattingly, supra
note 270, at 126.
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assets is expected to lower the per-unit costs of legal, engineering, and
environmental due diligence.355 Moreover, renewable energy developers that
use MLPs and REITs to finance and operate their projects need not reinvent the
wheel. Instead, they can model their financing and operating structures after
one of the many MLPs or the growing number of REITs for conventional
energy sources with similar risk-and-return profiles. In the words of the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, an "advantage[] to expanding the
eligibility of REITs and MLPs to include solar equipment is that solar
development would have access to an entire industry of lawyers, financiers, and
investors with the understanding, and experience, to deploy billions of dollars
in capital efficiently and effectively through REITs and MLPs." 357
D. How to Open MLPs and REITs to Renewables
REITs could be opened to renewable energy investment in one of two
ways. In a first-best scenario, Congress would amend the pertinent sections of
the tax code to add wind turbines, solar panel installations, and other renewable
358energy facilities as qualifying assets. Additionally, income from the
generation and sale of electricity produced with these assets would need to be
defined as REIT-eligible income.359 Alternatively, the IRS could issue new
regulations, revenue rulings, or private letter rulings to clarify that renewable
energy facilities meet the asset and income test requirements for REIT
eligibility. Given their broader reach, regulations or revenue rulings would
create greater policy certainty than fact-specific private letter rulings and
thereby encourage more investment. 360 Some doubt remains, however, whether
the existing statutory language can be interpreted to include all renewable
power plants as REIT-eligible assets and sources of income. The statutory
construction hinges on the question whether or not a renewable energy
installation qualifies as real property under the tax code. 3 Recent scholarship
suggests that the pertinent REIT provisions could be construed to justify an IRS
ruling that solar photovoltaic systems and wind turbines are REIT eligible,
while biomass-burning and geothermal systems would be more difficult to fit
362under the asset and income rules. Others see greater, albeit not
355. See Mendelsohn & Feldman, supra note 34, at 2.
356. For an overview of the many energy-related MLPs that could serve as model
structures for a renewable energy MLP, see Master Limited Partnerships 101: Understanding MLPs,
NAT'L ASS'N PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 270, at 30.
357. Feldman & Settle, supra note 331, at 20.
358. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2012).
359. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(d).
360. For a detailed discussion of the correlation between policy certainty and renewable
energy investment, see Mormann, supra note 247, at 705.
361. See, e.g., Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1413; David Feldman et al., The Technical
Qualifications for Treating Photovoltaic Assets as Real Property by Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl2osti/55396.pdf.
362. See Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1418; Feldman et al., supra note 361, at 10.
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insurmountable challenges to applying existing REIT provisions to entire wind
turbine installations.363 To add further complexity, IRS regulations or rulings
on the tax treatment of renewable energy installations as REIT-eligible real
property could create unwanted inconsistencies between federal and state law
that treats some of these installations as tax-exempt personal property.364 IRS
regulations or rulings in favor of renewable energy REITs may appear the more
viable path forward from a political economy perspective. The aforementioned
challenges, however, suggest a holistic legislative overhaul of the tax code's
REIT provisions-in close coordination with state governments-as the better,
albeit more politically challenging path forward.
In the case of MLPs, the tax code's express reference to exhaustible
natural resources leaves little room to construe the statutory language in a way
that would justify IRS regulations or rulings in favor of MLP eligibility for
renewable energy projects.366 The legislative materials leave no doubt that
Congress intended to exclude wind, solar, and other renewable energy
367technologies3. This restrictive interpretation of the tax code's MLP provisions
is further supported by the evident need for Congressional action to add
ethanol, biodiesel, and other renewable fuels to the list of qualifying natural
resources.368 Accordingly, the best-and likely only-path forward would
require Congress to amend the tax code to expressly include income derived
from the generation and sale of electricity from renewable energy among MLP-
qualifying sources of income. The Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act that
was recently introduced into the 1 13th Congress with bipartisan co-sponsorship
in both the House and Senate provides for such an amendment.369 In pertinent
363. See Levy et al., supra note 290, at 39.
364. See Feldman et al., supra note 361, at 10 (warning that many states treat solar
photovoltaic equipment as tax-exempt personal property).
365. As this Article is going to press, the IRS has just proposed new regulations to
clarify the definition of real property for the purposes of REIT eligibility, also with an eye toward
renewable energy power generation assets. See Definition of Real Estate Investment Trust Real
Property, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,508 (proposed May 14, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The proposed
regulations and their sample application by the IRS to solar power generation assets suggest a Pyrrhic
victory for renewables. Based on its proposed rules, the IRS grants REIT eligibility to smaller-scale,
commercial and residential solar assets but denies REIT eligibility to utility-scale solar assets. Id. at
27,514, 27,515 (Examples 8 & 9). This differential treatment appears to be based, in large part, on the
IRS's questionable assumption that solar assets for smaller-scale installations are custom-tailored and,
once installed, cannot be removed and reinstalled elsewhere without damage. Id. (Example 9(ii)-(iii)). In
reality, most of the materials used for solar rooftop and other smaller-scale installations are mass-
produced in the same standardized production cycles as utility-scale materials and can be removed and
reinstalled without major complications. This is not to suggest, however, that neither utility-scale nor
smaller-scale solar assets should be granted REIT eligibility. Rather, for its finalized regulations, the
IRS should include solar, wind, and other renewable power generation assets in its safe harbor list of
REIT-eligible, inherently permanent structures, to ensure both legal certainty and more cost-effective tax
policy support for low-carbon renewables. Id. at 27,511 (§ 1.856-10(d)(2)(iii)(B)).
366. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1) (2012).
367. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Section V.B.
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part, the Act proposes to add the following language to the tax code's catalog
of MLP-eligible sources of income:
(ii) RENEWABLE ENERGY- The generation of electric power exclusively utilizing any
resource described in section 45(c)(1) or energy property described in section 48 (determined
without regard to any termination date), or in the case of a facility described in paragraph (3)
or (7) of section 45(d) (determined without regard to any placed in service date or date by
which cawruction of the facility is required to begin), the accepting or processing of such
resource.
It remains to be seen whether growing bipartisan support will allow the
MLP Parity Act to pass both chambers of Congress and become law. The
timing for such an initiative, however, could hardly be better. Tax reform has
become a top priority for federal policymakers. One can only hope that they
will seize the opportunity to gradually replace wasteful and inefficient tax
policy such as the tax credit regime for renewables with smarter tax policy,
including MLPs and REITs for renewable energy.
E. Budget Implications of MLPs and REITs for Renewables
The most commonly voiced concerns over opening MLPs and REITs to
renewable energy investment revolve around fears that extending the
structures' tax privileges to renewables "could narrow the corporate tax base,
which is one of the reasons access to this structure was limited in the first
place." 371 In the interest of fiscal sustainability, some analysts and politicians
suggest that, rather than expand MLP and REIT eligibility beyond oil, gas, and
other conventional energy infrastructure, the two structures and their respective
tax privileges should be abolished altogether.372 Similarly, the End Polluter
Welfare Act, introduced in both chambers of the 112th Congress in 2012, called
for the elimination of virtually all tax privileges for fossil fuels, including their
eligibility for MLP investment. 373 To be sure, elimination of the panoply of tax
subsidies for oil, gas, coal, and other conventional energy would go a long way
in cutting federal tax expenditures. To do so at the expense of access to similar
incentives for emerging low-carbon renewable energy technologies, however,
would further entrench high-carbon energy incumbents. Thanks to decades of
federal subsidies these incumbents have reached such strong market positions
that emerging renewables struggle to overcome significant marketplace barriers
370. H.R. 1696, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 795, 113th Cong. (2013). Besides renewable
energy, the Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act aims to open MLPs to a range of other sustainable
energy investments, including building energy efficiency, combined heat and power, electricity storage,
and renewable thermal energy. Id.
371. SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 9.
372. See, e.g., Doug Koplow, Too Big to Ignore: Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Master
Limited Partnerships, EARTH TRACK (2013), http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2013/07/OCIMLP_2
01 3.pdf (arguing that MLPs should be abandoned altogether).
373. See H.R. 5745, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 3060, 112th Cong. (2012).
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to entry even when they receive federal (and state) incentives to help them
become cost-competitive, let alone without these incentives. 374 Moreover,
sweeping elimination of all energy subsidies would raise the cost of energy to
industry and consumers which, in turn, would stifle overall economic activity
and growth, threatening American leadership and competitiveness in the global
economy.375
Concern over the budgetary impacts of new tax policy is well warranted.
It is important, however, to evaluate these impacts in context. In the case of
MLPs and REITs for renewables this context assuages fears that extending both
structures to renewable energy investment could erode the corporate tax base.
As discussed earlier, the vast majority of renewable energy projects use some
version of the classic partnership structure to finance themselves.376 Given the
partnership's character as a pass-through entity, these project companies do not
pay income tax at the entity level. In other words, income from renewable
energy projects is already not subject to corporate income tax. If these projects
are given access to the MLP and REIT structures it is not their tax status that
will change but their ability to raise low-cost capital on public markets. 377 With
or without access to MLPs and REITs, the income of renewable energy projects
does not factor into the corporate tax base. Since the counterfactual to
renewable energy MLPs and REITs is, in most instances, not the renewable
energy corporation but rather the renewable energy partnership, fears that
opening MLPs and REITs to renewables would erode the corporate tax base are
378unfounded. It is impossible to erode what was never there. In other words,
renewable energy MLPs and REITs will not cost taxpayers any more in
foregone tax revenue than existing renewable energy partnerships that already
enjoy pass-through taxation,
Even the absolute (as opposed to additional) cost to taxpayers of giving
renewable energy access to MLPs and REITs is expected to be relatively
modest. In its recent scoring of the MLP Parity Act's projected impact on the
federal budget, the Joint Committee on Taxation forecast that the Act's
implementation would require tax expenditures of $307 million over five years
374. For a detailed discussion of the marketplace barriers to entry for renewable energy
technologies, see Mormann, supra note 17, at 919.
375. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 10; Mormann & Reicher, supra
note 158.
376. See supra Section III.E.
377. See also Hearing on Clean Energy Financing Before the S. Natural Res. & Energy
Comm., 113th Cong. 7 (2013) (statement of Richard Kauffman), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/in
dex.cfm/files/serve?File id=0488fbd8-d2b9-4fae-962f-04833e7f78d5 ("[T]he benefit in the cost of
capital is less about the tax benefits of MLPs and REITs and more about the fact that the cost of equity
is less in the stock market than in private equity.").
378. It should be noted that the choice between partnership and corporate structure
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and $1.3 billion over ten years. 379 These numbers are remarkable for two
reasons. First, they suggest a significantly lower cost to taxpayers than the
existing regime of federal tax credits for renewables, pegged at a total of $12.6
billion for fiscal years 2013-17.380 Second, the MLP Parity Act, as analyzed by
the Joint Committee on Taxation, would grant MLP access not only to
renewable energy but also to a range of other clean energy technologies,
including energy efficiency, carbon capture and sequestration, combined heat
and power, electricity storage, and renewable fuels.381 Accordingly, renewable
energy MLPs should be expected to cost taxpayers only a fraction of the MLP
Parity Act's overall projected cost. Importantly, the MLP Parity Act's relatively
low budgetary impact should not be misunderstood as an indication that the
Joint Committee on Taxation does not expect the MLP structure to be very
popular among clean energy developers and investors. On the contrary, the
Committee's budget estimates suggest that clean energy MLPs are, in fact,
expected to raise close to $18 billion of equity capital in the first five years and
nearly $60 billion over ten years.382
F. Making MLPs and REITs for Renewables a Reality
Before MLPs and REITs can become successful drivers of renewable
energy investment, a range of challenges will need to be addressed by both
policymakers and developers. Naturally, MLPs and REITs should only be
opened up to renewables if they, in fact, meet widespread developer and
investor needs.383 Federal policymakers will need to determine the relationship
between MLPs and REITs for renewable energy and existing tax incentives.3
If renewable energy MLPs and REITs are to reduce project financing costs at a
meaningful scale, the two structures must be able to leverage private capital
from currently sidelined investors. Finally, developers need to understand
which of the two structures most appeals to the particular type(s) of investor
they want to target. 386
1. If You Build It Will They Come?
Every policy, no matter how smart in theory, will only be successful in
practice if its implementation creates the right behavioral incentives. Publicly
379. See Felix Mormann et al., Clean Energy Scores a Success with the Master Limited
Partnership Act, BROOKINGS INST. (2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/19-cle
an-energy-mormann-reicher-muro.
380. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 117, at 31.
381. See H.R. 1696, S. 795, 113th Congress (2013).
382. See Mormann et al., supra note 379.
383. See infra Subsection V.F. 1.
384. See infra Subsection V.F.2.
385. See infra Subsection V.F.3.
386. See infra Subsection V.F.4.
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traded renewable energy MLPs and REITs can only deliver the aforementioned
benefits to renewables 387 if they are met with sufficient investor interest to
leverage direly needed low-cost capital. While investor behavior is not easy to
predict, there is good reason to believe that MLPs and REITs for renewables
will appeal to a deep and diverse pool of investors.
Strong historic growth in the market capitalization of MLPs and REITs,
despite offering modest dividend payments,388 suggests that investor demand
for both structures exceeds current supply. Existing MLPs and REITs have a
track record of leveraging capital from large-scale institutional and small-scale
retail investors alike. 389 Renewable energy MLPs and REITs may, in fact,
possess an even greater investor appeal. A recent analysis by the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory suggests that "a solar MLP or REIT would have
a similar, or perhaps lower, risk profile compared to their traditional
counterparts," 39 With similar off-take and other market risks across the
renewables industry, the case is likely to be even stronger for projects using
more mature and, hence, lower-risk technologies, such as wind or biomass
power generation. Already, renewable energy deployment is recognized as a
lucrative investment opportunity, as evidenced by the $850 million bond
offering for Warren Buffet's Topaz Solar Farm in California, which was
oversubscribed by more than $400 million.391 It is primarily a lack of suitable
financial vehicles for equity investment in renewables that has kept trillions of
dollars from pension funds and other institutional investors on the sidelines. 392
With risk-and-return profiles that meet or, potentially, exceed the requirements
of these investors, MLPs and REITs for renewables have the potential to be
game changers and raise billions of lower-cost capital.
2. Resolving the Interplay with Tax Credits for Renewables
There has been some concern whether opening MLPs and REITs up to
renewables would create windfall for developers and investors if they are able
to combine access to lower-cost public capital with the current regime of tax
credits. Under current law, however, the possibility of such double dipping is
limited.
In the MLP pass-through structure, both taxable income and associated
losses, including any tax credits, pass through to the MLP's unitholders.393 The
387. See supra Section V.C.
388. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
389. See Bullock et al., supra note 333, at 8.
390. See Feldman & Settle, supra note 331, at 22.
391. See Mendelsohn & Feldman, supra note 34, at 6.
392. See Raffacle Della Croce et al., The Role of Pension Funds in Financing Green
Growth Initiatives, OECD PUBLISHING 22 (2011) http://www.climatebonds.net/wp-content/uploads/201
1/09/OECD Role of PFsinFinancingGreenGrowth-WPIO.pdf; see also Mendelsohn & Feldman,
supra note 34, at 21.
393. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 39.
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tax code's at-risk and passive-loss rules, however, severely constrain the ability
of unitholders to monetize tax credits and depreciation benefits for renewable
energy. 394 Introduced in the 1980s to curtail the abuse of partnerships as tax
shelters, the at-risk rules limit the losses an investor can claim to the amount of
capital she actually stands to lose.395 For an individual MLP investor in a solar
energy project, for example, this means that the maximum amount she can
claim from the project's tax benefits to lower her tax bill is capped at the value
of her investment. The tax code's passive-loss rules add further restrictions by
limiting the taxable income to be offset with tax credits and other losses to
passive income, which is defined to exclude salaries, wages, and retirement
income as well as gains from stocks and bonds.396 In fact, an individual
investor holding interests in several MLPs cannot even use the losses and tax
credits from one MLP to offset taxable income from another MLP.397 It should
be noted that the tax code's passive-loss rules do not apply to unitholders that
are publicly traded corporations, which are allowed to use tax credits and other
losses from their MLP investment to lower their tax liability from other passive
or active income up to the limit imposed by the at-risk rules.398 For non-
corporate MLP investors, however, the passive-loss rules impose significant
limitations on their ability to monetize a renewable energy project's tax credits.
Unlike MLPs, REITs do not pass the right to claim tax credits and other
losses through to their shareholders. 399 The stranded tax credits, however, offer
little value to the REIT at the entity level. After all, a REIT has little use for tax
credits given that it can avoid taxation at the entity level altogether by
distributing its income to its shareholders.400 In fact, the tax code requires
REITs to pass at least ninety percent of their taxable income through to their
shareholders. 401 As a result, renewable energy REITs could use federal tax
credits to offset ten percent of their taxable income at most.
In light of the tax code's at-risk and passive-loss rules, analysts have
noted that, under current law, "it is almost impossible for single-project MLPs
to fully monetize tax credits and depreciation benefits." 402 "Nor do those credits
generally provide any significant benefit at the REIT level."403 In light of these
limitations, some have concluded that the extension of MLPs and REITs to
394. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 465, 469 (2012).
395. See 26 U.S.C. § 465(a)(1)(B); see also Kovacheva & Di Capua, supra note 346,
at 9 (discussing the at-risk rules' implications for renewable energy MLPs).
396. See 26 U.S.C. § 469(c).
397. See 26 U.S.C. § 469(k).
398. See 26 U.S.C. § 469(a)(2); see also Kovacheva & Di Capua, supra note 346, at 10
(discussing the passive-loss rules' implications for renewable energy MLPs).
399. See Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1422.
400. See supra Section V.A.
401. See 26 U.S.C. § 857(a)(1)(A).
402. Kovacheva & Di Capua, supra note 346, at 10.
403. Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1422.
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renewable energy would need to be accompanied by changes to the tax code in
order to allow for better compatibility with existing tax credits.
Efficiency considerations, however, suggest that MLPs and REITs be
opened for renewable energy investment without changes to the tax code's at-
risk and passive-loss rules. Inviting renewable energy developers to combine
cost-effective MLP and REIT financing with tax credit support would likely
infuse projects with the same inefficiencies that haunt the current regime.405 In
the absence of meaningful reform, such as the authorization of refundability or
406tradability, tax credits for renewable energy should eventually be replaced by
access to MLPs and REITs and other, more cost-effective deployment policies.
Sweeping reform that immediately ends tax credit support for renewables
would likely prove disruptive to the industry as a whole.407 Recent scholarship
has demonstrated the critical importance of policy stability and certainty to
stimulate sustainable investment in renewable energy. 408 Consequently, even a
policy as inefficient as the current regime of federal tax credits should not be
dismantled from one day to the next but, instead, phased out gradually allowing
the industry time to prepare and adjust.409
In the interim, giving developers a choice between either traditional tax
equity deals using tax credits or MLPs and REITs with access to low-cost
capital would enable the market to determine which of the two policy tools
offers greater value and to whom. Developers with well-established ties to tax
investors may continue to prefer traditional tax equity financing while others,
especially new market entrants, may well choose to raise capital on public
markets through MLPs and REITs. Besides, market participants are likely in a
better position than policymakers to identify and exploit creative deal
structures, such as hybrid portfolio MLPs that hold both income-generating
fossil and tax benefit-generating renewable power assets. These hybrid MLPs
could achieve financial synergies, e.g., by using the income from the portfolio's
fossil assets to monetize the renewable assets' tax benefits, as well as physical
synergies, e.g., by building wind turbines to run the pumping stations of a
natural gas pipeline. Until tax credits are fully phased out, the availability of
two alternative financing models would also give developers a stronger
404. See, e.g., SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 9 ("If passive loss rules are
restructured to allow investors to use these tax losses to offset other income, renewable energy
investment might become more attractive."); BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER, supra note 21, at 17 n.24
("Apart from changing the definitions of eligible activities under these rules, other changes would need
to be made to section 469 of the tax code, which governs 'passive activity rules,' and to Section 465,
which governs 'at-risk' rules.").
405. See supra Part Ill.
406. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
407. For evidence of the disastrous effects of previous policy interruptions on the U.S.
renewables industry, see MENDONCA ET AL., supra note 40, at 173-75.
408. See Mormann, supra note 247, at 705, 711.
409. See also Statement of Dan W. Reicher, supra note 76, at 3, 8 (calling for a "smart
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bargaining position vis-A-vis tax investors helping them negotiate a lower yield
rate for tax equity investments. Driving down the portion of tax credits' subsidy
value that tax equity investors can appropriate would leave more tax dollars to
directly fund wind turbines, solar installations, and other renewable energy
infrastructure. Greater competition both among tax equity investors and,
critically, between traditional tax equity structures and innovative MLP and
REIT financing structures, could therefore increase the subsidy efficiency of
tax credits, i.e., how many tax dollars actually go to fund the deployment of
new renewable power capacity. Improvements in the subsidy efficiency would
be even greater if Congress made renewable energy tax credits refundable
and/or tradable, thereby eliminating the need for tax equity altogether. By
diminishing or eliminating the tax equity investor's costly role as middle man,
these gains in subsidy efficiency would allow Congress to phase down the face
value of tax support for renewables, reducing the burden on taxpayers while
still delivering the necessary level of support to ensure sustained deployment.
3. Understanding the Heterogeneity of Investor Needs
In the aggregate, MLPs and REITs appeal to a broad spectrum of
410investors. Individually, however, each of the two structures exhibits special
characteristics that make it more attractive to some investors and less attractive
to others. The greater capacity of MLPs to pass tax losses and other benefits
through to their investors is one such characteristic that will likely lead
corporate investors to prefer renewable energy MLPs to REITs. 411 If MLPs and
REITs are to become successful drivers of renewable energy investment, it is
crucial that project developers understand which of the two structures to choose
in order to appeal to their preferred type of investors.
All else being equal, retail investors who trade stocks for their personal
accounts will likely prefer to invest in renewable energy REITs rather than
MLPs due to differing tax reporting requirements. Tax reporting for REIT
investments is similarly straightforward as tax reporting for a standard savings
account. Investors simply use the Form 1099-DIV they receive from the REIT
by January 31 to report their dividend income to the IRS.412 MLP investors, on
the other hand, are required to file the considerably more complex Form K-1 to
declare their MLP-related income.413 Given that MLPs are not required to file
their partnership tax returns until April 15, investors may need to file for an
extension of their own filing date to include Forms K-1 that they receive after
April 15.4 To make matters more complicated, MLP investors may be
410. See supra Subsection V.C.2.
411. See supra Subsection V.F.2.
412. See Levy et al., supra note 290, at 38.
413. See Durbin et al., supra note 327, at 12; Taxation of Master Limited Partnerships,
WELLS FARGO ADVISORS 2 (2009).
414. See WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, supra note 413, at 2.
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required to file state income returns for every state in which the MLP owns
415assets or conducts business. While these tax reporting requirements apply to
retail and institutional investors alike, they are more relevant to retail investors
who are less likely than institutional investors to have a specialized tax advisor
to prepare their tax filings.
Institutional investors, too, will likely judge the appeal of REITs and
MLPs differently, especially if they are charities, pension funds, individual
retirement accounts, foundations, endowments or other entities that are exempt
from federal income taxation. For each of these entities, the tax exemption
generally applies only to income that is related to the entity's original
416purpose. Income from MLP investments in excess of $1,000 per year is
considered taxable income from unrelated business and, therefore, subject to
federal income taxation at the corporate tax rate.417 The American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 Act has exempted MLP-related income of mutual funds
from taxation as unrelated business taxable income.418 Dividend income from
REITs, on the other hand, is never treated as taxable income from unrelated
business and, therefore, does not subject otherwise tax-exempt entities to
income taxation.419 As a result, tax-exempt investors will likely prefer
renewable energy REITs to MLPs.
Finally, foreign investors will likely find renewable energy projects more
attractive if they are structured as REITs rather than MLPs. Depending on the
investment circumstances, REITs may allow a foreign investor to pay up to 39
percentage points less federal income tax for operating income distributions
and up to 54 percentage points less tax on exit gains than MLPs.420
Conclusion
The current regime of federal tax credits for renewable energy reminds us
that there is no one-size-fits-all policy to induce investment and economic
growth. Tax credits may work well for mature industries that generate steady
flows of taxable income to offset. But they are a poor fit for the emerging
renewables industry whose high up-front capital intensity prevents projects
from generating taxable profits for the first ten or more years of operation. In
the absence of taxable income to offset, renewable energy project developers
are unable to reap the immediate benefit of their projects' tax credits without
the help of a tax equity investor who can monetize the credits by offsetting tax
liabilities from other sources. The need for such tax equity, however, drives up
415. See Levy et al., supra note 290, at 38.
416. See SHERLOCK & KEIGHTLEY, supra note 271, at 5.
417. See Durbin et al., supra note 327, at 12; WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, supra note
413, at 2.
418. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
419. See Dowdall, supra note 27, at 1410.
420. See Levy et al., supra note 290, at 38.
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a project's financing charges and transaction costs. In the process, a third or
more of the tax credits' subsidy value is diverted away from project developers
and into the pockets of bankers and lawyers. The resulting inefficiencies are
bad news not only for the struggling renewables industry but, critically, for the
federal government and its taxpayers.
The political economy of renewable energy favors tax policy over non-tax
policy options. As tax credits prove inefficient yet immune to reform proposals
to authorize their refundability or tradability, the time has come to phase them
out in favor of other, more cost-effective tax policy options. Combining the tax
benefits of a partnership with the fundraising advantages of a corporation,
MLPs and REITs could dramatically reduce the cost of capital for renewable
energy and thereby drive down the price of renewable electricity. With a
proven track record for the cost-efficient promotion of oil, gas, and other
conventional energy infrastructure, tax-privileged MLPs and REITs for
renewables would foster policy parity while moving renewable energy a big
step closer to grid parity and subsidy independence. Publicly traded MLPs and
REITs would allow renewable energy projects to graduate from the constrained
niche market for tax equity to public capital markets that appeal to large-scale
institutional investors and smaller-scale individual investors alike. MLPs and
REITs would promote popular support for renewables by allowing millions of
Americans to invest in the nation's energy future. Most importantly, MLPs and
REITs could deliver these and more benefits to renewable energy projects at
significantly lower cost to taxpayers than the current regime of tax credits.
With tax reform a top priority for federal policymakers, the time has come
for smarter tax policy that promotes renewable energy more effectively and at
lower cost to the federal government and its taxpayers. MLPs and REITs prove
that tax policy can, indeed, strike a sensible balance among some of the
nation's most pressing concerns-from fiscal discipline to technology
innovation to economic growth to climate change. We may have run out of
money, but we have not run out of ideas. Let's use this intellectual capital to
develop smarter tax policy for a cleaner, more democratic energy future.
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